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Abstract
We develop an equilibrium lifecycle model of education, marriage and labor supply
and consumption in a transferable utility context. Individuals start by choosing their in-
vestments in education anticipating returns in the marriage market and the labor market.
They then match based on the economic value of marriage and on preferences. Equilib-
rium in the marriage market determines intrahousehold allocation of resources. Following
marriage households (married or single) save, supply labor and consume private and pub-
lic commodities under uncertainty. Marriage thus has the dual role of providing public
goods and offering risk sharing. The model is estimated using the British HPS.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Matching on human capital
The present paper explores the intersection of two fundamental Beckerian concepts: human
capital and matching. We are now used to considering education as an investment, whereby
agents give up present consumption for higher income and consumption tomorrow. Similarly,
we routinely think of marriage in terms of a matching game, in which couples create a surplus
that is distributed between spouses, according to some endogenous rule that reflects equilib-
rium constraints. Still, the interaction between these notions remains largely unexplored. In
particular, whether individuals, on the marriage market, can be expected to match assorta-
tively on human capital is largely an open question. For instance, in the presence of domestic
production, one may in some cases expect negative assortative matching, a point stressed by
Becker himself in his seminal 1973 contribution.
Even if household production is disregarded, the analysis of matching on human capital raises
challenging questions. Recent work on the dynamics of wages and labor supply has emphasized
the importance of productivity shocks, which typically take a multiplicative form. It follows
that higher human capital comes with higher expected wages, but also possibly with more
wage volatility. In such a context, whether an educated individual, receiving a large but highly
uncertain income, will match with a similar spouse or will trade lower spousal expected income
for a lower volatility is not clear. While any individual probably prefers a wealthier spouse,
even at the cost of higher volatility, how this preference varies with the individual’s own income
process - the crucial determinant of assortativeness when intra-couple transfers are allowed,
which is our case - is far from obvious.
We believe that the interaction between educational choices and matching patterns is of cru-
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cial importance for analyzing the long-run effects of a given policy. When considering the
consequences of, say, a tax reform, standard labor supply models, whether unitary or collec-
tive, typically take education and family composition as given. While such assumptions make
perfect sense from a short-term perspective, they may severely bias our understanding of the
reform’s long-term outcome. Education policy, taxation and welfare programs have a double
impact on incentives to invest in human capital. On the one hand, they directly affect the
returns from the investment perceived on the labor market. On the other hand, they also
influence matching patterns, hence the additional returns reaped on the marriage market - the
so-called ‘marital college premium’, whose importance for human capital investment has been
emphasized by several recent contributions (Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss, 2009, from now on
CIW; Chiappori, Salanié and Weiss, 2014, from now on CSW). Added to that is the effect
that taxes and welfare have on insurance, which can also affect both marital patterns and
investment in human capital. In the long run, these aspects may be of major importance.
The main motivation of the present paper is precisely to provide an explicit framework in
which these effects can be conceptually analyzed and empirically quantified. Our model has
several, original features. Following a Beckerian tradition, we model marriage as a frictionless,
matching game in a Transferable Utility (TU) framework with risk averse agents. Individual
utilities have an economic and a non economic component. The economic gain from mar-
riage is twofold: spouses share a public good, and also insure each other against productivity
shocks. In addition, marriage provides idiosyncratic, non-monetary benefits, which are addi-
tively separable and education-specific, as in Choo and Siow (2006, henceforth CS) and CSW.
The TU property implies that, once married, households behave as a single decision-maker
(unitary household). Despite its obvious shortcomings, this property considerably simplifies
the analysis of the couple’s dynamics of consumption and labor supply.
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We consider a three-stage model, and assume Pareto efficiency and full commitment. We
abstract from issues relating to divorce and our full commitment assumption precludes rene-
gotiation; these are important questions we wish to address as this research agenda develops.
Agents first independently invest in human capital; their decision is driven by their idiosyn-
cratic characteristics - ability, cost of investment (which may for instance reflect borrowing
constraints) and preferences for marriage - and the expected returns on investment, which is
itself determined by the equilibrium prevailing on the relevant markets. In the second stage,
individuals match on the marriage market, based on their human capital and their idiosyn-
cratic preferences for marriage. Finally, the last period is divided into T subperiods, during
which couples or singles consume private and public goods, save and supply labor subject to
permanent and transitory wage shocks, very much like standard lifecycle models.
As is usual, such a game can be solved backwards, starting with the third stage. Due to
the TU assumption, the analysis of the dynamic labor supply model exactly characterizes the
total surplus generated by marriage, while it is compatible with any intra-couple distribution of
surplus. The matching game in the second stage is defined by the joint distribution of human
capital and marital preferences among men and women, as resulting from investment during
the first stage, and the expected surplus generated in the third stage. Crucially, equilibrium
conditions on the marriage market fully determine the intra-household allocation of the surplus
for all possible levels of human capital. In particular, these conditions allow the characterization
for each individual of the consequences, in expected utility terms, of the various levels of human
capital they may choose to acquire. This ‘education premium’, in turn, determines education
decisions in the first stage. In essence, therefore, investments in the first stage are modeled
under a rational expectations logic: agents anticipate a given vector of returns to education,
and the resulting decisions lead to an equilibrium in the marriage market which is compatible
with these expectations.
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In this context, the impact of any given policy reform can be considered along several dimen-
sions. Coming back to the tax reform example, the short term impact can be analyzed from
the dynamic labor supply model of the third stage: existing couples (and singles) respond to
changes in income tax by adjusting their labor supply and their public and private consump-
tions. From a longer-term perspective, however, matching on the marriage market will also be
affected; typically, the respective importance of economic and non economic factors will vary,
resulting in changes in the level of assortativeness on human capital, therefore ultimately in
inter- and intra-household inequality. Finally, the changes affect the returns on investment
in human capital both directly (through their impact on after tax income) and indirectly (by
their consequences on the marriage market); they can therefore be expected to propagate to
human capital investments. Similar arguments can be made for education policy or welfare
reform. Imperfect as it may be, our approach is the first to consider all these aspects in a
unified and theoretically consistent framework.
In the next subsection we discuss some of the existing literature. Then in Sections 2 and 3
we present the model and develop its solution. Section 4 discusses the identification of the
distribution of marital preferences. In Section 5 we present the data and in Section 6 we
present our estimation approach. In Sections 7 and 8 we discuss the empirical results and a
counterfactual simulation. Section 9 concludes and discusses future avenues of research.
1.2 Existing literature
Our paper is a direct extension of the collective models of Chiappori (1988,1992) and Blundell,
Chiappori and Meghir (2005) amongst others. In these models there is no time/dynamic
dimension. This restriction is relaxed here. Thus the framework we use is directly related to
intertemporal models of labor supply and savings over the life-cycle, such as Mazzocco (2007),
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who uses a collective framework, and Attanasio, Low and Sanchez-Marcos (2008) and Low,
Meghir and Pistaferri (2010) who focus respectively on female and male labor supply. Similarly
in a recent paper Blundell et al. (2016) consider female labor supply over the lifecycle in a
context where household composition is changing over the lifecycle but exogenously. More
closely to this paper Low et al. (2015) allow for endogenous marriage decisions with limited
commitment in a partial equilibrium context with frictions but treating education as exogenous.
Goussé, Jacquemet and Robin (2016) specify an equilibrium model of marriage and labor
supply based on search frictions. Their model draws from Shimer and Smith (2000) and the
complementarity arises from the production of public goods that depends on the wages of both
spouses. Their model does not include savings and the only source of uncertainty is exogenous
divorce. Moreover it does not allow for endogenous education choices. Finally, precursors of this
paper are CIW (2008), which specifies a theoretical model of education decisions, the marriage
market and time at home, and CSW, which provides an empirical estimation; however, both
papers adopt a reduced form specification in which marital gains are recovered from matching
patterns without analyzing actual behavior.1
Our model is also related to recent developments on the econometrics of matching models under
transferable utility (see Chiappori and Salanié 2015 for a recent survey). In particular, the
stochastic structure representing idiosyncratic preferences for marriage is directly borrowed
from CS and CSW. Our framework, however, introduces several innovations. First, agents
match on human capital - unlike CS, where they match on age, and CSW, where they match
on education. Human capital, in our framework, depends on education but also on innate
ability. In principle, the latter is not observed by the econometrician. However, observing
agents’ wage and labor supply dynamics (during the third stage) allows us to recover the
1Theoretical models with prematch investments include Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (2001), Nöldeke and
Samuelson (2015) and Peters and Siow (2002).
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joint distribution of education and ability, therefore of human capital ; interestingly, these
distributions are sufficient to fully characterize the equilibrium. A second difference is that both
CS and CSW identify the structural model under consideration from the sole observation of
matching patterns. As a result, CS is exactly identified under strong, parametric assumptions,
whereas identification in CSW comes from the observation of multiple cohorts together with
parametric restrictions on how surplus may change across cohorts. In our case, on the contrary,
our structural model of household labor supply allows us to identify preferences, therefore the
surplus function. The matching model, therefore, is over identified, and allows us to recover the
intra-couple allocation of surplus while generating additional, testable restrictions. Lastly, this
identification, together with the knowledge of the joint distribution of ability and education,
enable us to explicitly model the process of educational choice. As a consequence, we can
evaluate the long term impact of a given policy reform on human capital formation. While
the link between intra-household allocation and investment in human capital has already been
analyzed from a theoretical perspective,2 our approach is, to the best of our knowledge, the
first to explore it empirically through a full-fledged structural model.
2 The model
2.1 Time structure
We model the life-cycle of a cohort of women f ∈ F and men m ∈M, so time and age will be
used interchangeably and commonly represented by t. The individual’s life cycle is split into
three stages, indexed 1 to 3. In stage 1, individuals draw a vector of marital preferences and
invest in human capital by choosing one of three educational levels. This investment depends
2See for instance CIW.
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on their innate ability and their cost of education, as well as on the perceived benefits of this
investment, including the benefits to be received on the marriage market; the latter, in turn,
are directly influenced by marital preferences. The ability of agent i, denoted θi, belongs to a




. Education costs are continuously distributed, and the




. At the end
of period 1, each agent is thus characterized by human capital (or productivity type) H (s, θ),
which is a summary measure of education and innate ability. The distribution of human capital
has a finite support H of cardinality (at most) J × N . So at this stage the agent belongs to




that fully characterize his/her prospects in the
marriage and labour markets.
In stage 2, individuals enter the marriage market; the latter is modeled as a frictionless match-
ing process based on the level of human capital, and on marital preferences. At the end of
stage 2, some individuals are married whereas the others remain single forever.
Stage 3 (the ‘working life’ stage) is divided into T periods; in each period, individuals, whether
single or married, observe their (potential) wage and non labor income, and decide on consump-
tions and labor supplies. Credit markets are assumed complete, so that agents can, during
their active life, borrow or save at the same interest rate. Following a collective logic (Chiap-
pori 1988, 1992), decisions made by married couples are assumed Pareto-efficient. Moreover,
the intra-household allocation of private consumption (therefore of welfare) is endogenous, and
determined by commitments made at the matching stage. In particular, we do not consider
divorce or separation in this model.
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2.2 Economic utilities
The lifetime utility of agent i is the sum of three components. The first is the expected,
discounted sum of economic utilities generated during the T periods of i’s third stage of life by
consumptions and labour supply; the second is the subjective utility of marriage (or singlehood)
generated by the agents’ marital preferences; and the third is the utility cost of education
attendance. In what follows, we consider the following economic utilities at date t of stage 3:
uit (Qt, Cit, Lit) = ln (CitQt + αitLitQt) (1)
where L is non-market time and C and Q are private and public consumptions, respectively.
We take labor supply choices to be discrete: agents choose either to participate to the labor
market (L = 0) or not to (L = 1).
The choices of consumptions, labour supply and savings are driven by time-varying preferences
and income. First, wages at age t are determined by the person’s age and human capital, itself
a function of education si and ability θi, and also by an idiosyncratic productivity shock that
may have a transitory and a permanent component. Formally:
wit = WG (Hi, t) eit (2)
where wit denotes i’s earnings at age t, G = M,F indexes i’s gender group,WG is the aggregate,
gender-specific price of human capital class Hi at age t, Hi = H (si, θi) is i’s human capital,
and eit is an idiosyncratic shock. Second, preferences may vary; in practice, the αit are random
variables.
Two remarks can be made on these utilities. From an ordinal viewpoint, they belong to
Bergstrom and Cornes’ Generalized Quasi Linear (GQL) family. As a consequence, at any
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period and for any realization of family income, they satisfy the Transferable Utility (TU)
property. For a given couple (m, f), any conditional (on employment and savings) Pareto
efficient choice of consumption and public goods maximizes the sum of the spouse’s exponential
of utilities:3
expui (Qt, Cit, Lit) + expuj (Qt, Cjt, Ljt) = (Cit + Cjt + αitLit + αjtLjt)Qt (3)
Solving this program gives the optimal choice of aggregate household private and public con-
sumptions at each period, conditional on labor supplies and savings. The latter are then
determined from a dynamic perspective, by maximizing the expected value of the discounted
sum (over periods t to the end of life) of utilities.
From a cardinal perspective, the Von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities defined by (1) belong to
the ISHARA class, defined by Mazzocco (2007). By a result due to Schulhofer-Wohl (2006), this
implies that the TU property also obtains ex-ante, in expectations. In particular, there exists
a specific cardinalization of each agent’s lifetime economic utility such that any household
maximizes the sum of lifetime utilities of its members, under an intertemporal household
budget constraint. Specifically, we show below the following result. Take a couple (m, f)
with respective human capital Hm and Hf , and let Vm and Vf denote their respective, lifetime
expected utility. There exists a function Υ (H), where H = (Hm, Hf ), such that the set of
3In the static model, one can use expui as a particular cardinalization of i’s preferences. Then any
(ex post) efficient allocation maximize some weighted sum of utilities of the form expui (Qt, Cit, Lit) +
µ expuj (Qt, Cjt, Ljt) ≥ ūj under a budget constraint. Here, the maximand is equal to
(Cit + µCjt + αitLit + µαjtLjt)Qt
and the first order conditions with respect to private consumptions (assuming the latter are positive) give:
Qt = λt = µQt
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier of the budget constraint. It follows that µ = 1, implying that any Pareto
efficient solution with positive private consumptions must maximize the sum of expui.
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is an increasing function of Vi; therefore, in the stage 2 matching game, it is a specific (and
convenient) representation of i’s (expected) utility. If we define






the previous relationship becomes:
Ūm + Ūf = Γ (Hm, Hf ) (5)
which shows that we are in a TU context even ex-ante, since the Pareto frontier is, for these
utility indices, a straight line with slope -1 for all wages and incomes. The function Γ (Hm, Hf ),
when evaluated at the point of marriage, is the economic value generated by marriage. An
important consequence is that, throughout the third stage (their working life), couples behave
as a single decision maker maximizing the function Γ (or equivalently Υ). In particular, a
standard, unitary model of dynamic labor supply can be used at that stage.
Alternatively, agents may choose to remain single; then they maximize the discounted sum of
expected utility under an intertemporal, individual budget constraint. We denote V ςm (Hm) and
V ςf (Hf ) the respective lifetime economic utility of a single male (female) with human capital
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Hm (Hf ). Note these expressions, again, are expectations taken over future realizations of the
preferences and wages shocks; they are contingent on the information known at the date of
marriage, namely each person’s ability and education, as summarized by the person’s human
capital. In line with the previous notations, we then define:







Finally, for any man m with human capital Hm and any woman f with human capital Hf , the
difference between the economic value that would be generated by their marriage, Γ (Hm, Hf ),
and the sum of m’s and f ’s respective expected utility as singles is the economic surplus gen-
erated by the marriage. Again, it depends only on both spouses’ productivity and education,
and is denoted
Σ (Hm, Hf ) = Γ (Hm, Hf )− Ū ςm − Ū ςf . (7)
Note that all these expressions refer to the same cardinalization of lifetime expected utilities,
given by (4).
2.3 Marital preferences
Our representation of marital preferences follow that of CS and CSW. Before investing, agent
i draws a vector βi = (β0i , βHi where H ∈ H), where βHi represents i’s subjective satisfaction of
being married to a spouse with human capital H and β0i denotes his/her subjective satisfaction
of remaining single. We assume that the total gain generated by the marriage of man m with
human capital Hm and woman f with human capital Hf is the sum of the economic gain
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Γ (Hm, Hf ) defined above and the idiosyncratic preference shocks β:





and the resulting surplus is:













Again, the function Σ (Hm, Hf ) is defined as the expected economic lifetime surplus for a couple
with human capital composition (Hm, Hf ), over and above what they would each obtain as
singles. The remaining part of the expression relates to the non-economic benefits of marriage.4
Importantly, it is a restriction of this model that the idiosyncratic preferences ofm, as described
by the random vector βm, only depend on the education of m’s spouse, not on her identity. In
other words, non-pecuniary preferences are over people with different levels of human capital,
not over specific persons. This assumption is crucial, because it allows us to fully characterize
the stochastic distribution of individual utilities at the stable match (see CSW and Chiappori
and Salanié 2015).5
4It should be stressed that our interpretation of βHi as i’s subjective utility of being married to a spouse with
human capital H is by no means the only possible. Alternatively, βHi could be some unobserved characteristic
of i that is identically valued by all spouses with human capital H. The crucial property is that this term
enhances total surplus in a way that does not depend on the spouse’s identity, but only on her/his human
capital.
5Moroever, the introduction, in the marital gain generated by the couple (m, f), of match-specific terms
of the form εmf would raise specific difficulties in our frictionless framework. For instance, if the ε are as-
sumed i.i.d., then when the number of individuals becomes large the fraction of singles goes to zero (and their
conditional utility tends to infinity). See Chiappori, Nguyen and Salanié 2015 for a precise discussion.
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2.4 Second stage matching game
At the end of the first stage, agents are each characterised by their marital preferences, but
also by their human capital H, a function of their innate ability θ and education s. From the
second perspective, the male and female populations are therefore distributed over the space
H, which consists of N × J classes. They then enter a matching game under TU, in which the
surplus function for any potential match is given by (9).
As usual, a matching is defined by a measure on the product space of male and female charac-
teristics (i.e., H×H) and two sets of individual utility levels, (Um) and (Uf ), such that for any
pair (m, f) on the support of the measure - that is, for any couple that matches with positive
probability:
Um + Uf = Γmf
Intuitively, the pair (Um, Uf ) describes how the total gain gmf generated by the possible mar-
riage of m and f would be divided between the spouses. The matching is stable if (i) no
married person would rather be single, and (ii) no two individuals would strictly prefer being
married to each other to remaining in their current situation. A direct consequence is that for
any pair (m, f), it must be the case that:6
Um + Uf ≥ Γmf
Now, a crucial result by Chiappori, Salanié and Weiss is the following:
Theorem 1. (Choo and Siow, 2006; Chiappori, Salanié and Weiss, 2015) If the
surplus is given by (9), then there exist 2 (NJ)2 numbers - ŪM (Hm, Hf ) and ŪF (Hm, Hf ) for
6If this inequality was violated for some couple (m, f), one could conclude that m and f are not matched
(then an equality would obtain) but should be matched (since each of them could be made better off than their
current situation), a violation of stability.
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(Hm, Hf ) ∈ H2 - such that:
1. For any (Hm, Hf )
ŪM (Hm, Hf ) + ŪF (Hm, Hf ) = Γ (Hm, Hf ) (10)
2. For any m with human capital Hm married to f with human capital Hf ,
Um = ŪM (Hm, Hf ) + β
Hf
m and (11)
Uf = ŪF (Hm, Hf ) + β
Hm
f
Proof. See Chiappori, Salanié and Weiss (2015).
In words, the utility of any man m at the stable matching is the sum of a deterministic
component, which only depends on his and his spouse’s human capital, and ofm’s idiosyncratic
net preference for marrying a spouse with that human capital; the same type of result obtains
for women. For notational consistency, if i remains single we consider the class of his spouse
to be 0.
Note that the characterization of utilities provided by (11) refers to a specific cardinalization
of individual utilities, defined by (Um, Uf ); technically, this is the particular cardinalization
that exhibits the TU property. Obviously, it can equivalently be translated into the initial














where gi is the gender of i and Hj denotes the human capital of i’s spouse.
An immediate corollary is the following:
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Corollary 1. 1. For any man m with human capital Hm, m’s spouse at the stable matching
has human capital Hf if and only if the following inequalities hold for all H ∈ H ∪ {0}:
ŪM (Hm, Hf ) + β
Hf
m ≥ ŪM (Hm, H) + βHm
2. For any woman f with human capital Hf , f ’s spouse at the stable matching has human
capital Hm if and only if the following inequalities hold for all H ∈ H ∪ {0}:
ŪF (Hm, Hf ) + β
Hm
f ≥ ŪF (H,Hf ) + β
H
f









and the utility of a female agent f with human capital Hf and preferences βm is:
AF (Hf ) = max
Hm∈H∪{0}
(





The main implication of this result is that marital choices in stage 2 can be modeled as
individual, discrete choice problems, in which the thresholds ŪM (Hm, Hf ) and ŪF (Hm, Hf )
can be identified using standard techniques. Note, however, that these parameters are not
independent, since they have to satisfy the restrictions (10); we will return to this point later
on. Also, note that these ex-ante expected utilities only depend on the individual’s stock of
human capital.
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2.5 First stage: the education choice
In the first stage of life, individuals decide upon the level of educational investment. We
assume there are three choices, corresponding to three classes in S: statutory schooling, high
school and college. Each level of education s is associated with a cost cs(X, υs) where X are
observable characteristics and υs is an unobservable cost.
Defining human capital as a function of schooling and ability H(s, θ), education choice is
defined by
for man m : sm = arg max
s∈S
{AM(H(s, θm))− cs(Xm, υms)} (15)
for woman f : sf = arg max
s∈S
{AF (H(s, θf ))− cs(Xf , υfs)} (16)
where AM and AF are defined in equations 13 and 14 for males and females, respectively, and
where the subscript s indexes schooling level s. Individuals are assumed to know their ability
at that point, but this may not be observable by the econometrician. Education choice takes
into account both the returns in the labor market and the returns in the marriage market,
which are embedded in the value functions for each choice.
Lastly, the structure of that stage is a simultaneous move game: agents each choose their
education independently, but the payoffs they will receive depend on the human capital dis-
tribution on both sides of the market, which results from other players’ investment. This,
potentially, raises existence and uniqueness issues that will be discussed below.
17
3 Solving the model
It is instructive to outline the solution of the problem. As is standard in dynamic models of the
lifecycle, the model is solved working backwards from the end of life. We therefore start with the
last period of the third stage. As mentioned before, the TU property implies that any married
couple behaves as a single decision maker maximizing the sum of the spouses’ (exponential of)
utilities: the Pareto weights associated with our original logarithmic cardinalization of utilities,
which determine the intrahousehold allocation of welfare, do not affect aggregate household
consumption, savings and individual labor supply decisions. Singles maximize their own utility.
Both maximizations are subject to an intertemporal budget constraint.
3.1 Employment, consumption and savings during the working life
We start with the labor supply and consumption decisions. The form of preferences allows us
to easily derive consumptions from savings and labor supply choices; savings are then chosen
to satisfy the conditional (on labor supply) intertemporal optimality condition; optimal labor
supply is then the solution to a discrete choice problem.
3.1.1 General solution to the couple’s problem in period t
In Appendix A we derive the solution to the last period of life, T . Many of the properties of
that last period, such as the separability of the Pareto weights in the individual value function,
carry over to the general solution for any of the earlier periods. Here we show the form of the
solution for an earlier period, t < T .
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Consumptions Each period/age t sees the arrival of new information on each spouse’s pref-
erences for working and productivity, αt = (αmt, αft) and et = (emt, eft). Choice is also
conditional on the other circumstances faced by the couple, namely savings carried over from
the previous period, Kt−1, and the spouses’ human capital, H = (Hm, Hf ). Given the infor-
mation set (αt, et, Kt−1,H), we first consider the couple’s consumption decisions conditional
on savings and employment, Kt and Lt = (Lmt, Lft). For the within period problem of re-
source allocation to private consumption (C) and public good (Q), we can use the exponential
cardinalization of individual preferences. The couple thus solves:
max
Qt,Ct
Qt (Ct + αmtLmt + αftLft)
under the budget constraint wmt + wft + yCt +RKt−1 = Kt + Ct + wmtLmt + wftLft + pQt
Here wmt + wft is the couple’s total (‘potential’) labor income in period t, and yCt is the
couple’s non labor income. Note that the latter may depend on individual labor supplies and
earnings, which allows for means tested benefits and taxes as well as benefits that depend on
participation, such as unemployment insurance or earned income tax credits. Wages are as
defined in equation (2) and considered net of income taxes. Finally, R is the risk-free interest
rate at which savings accumulate over periods, Ct = Cmt + Cft is total expenditure in the
private consumption of spouses, and pQt is total expenditure in the public good.
Conditional on savings and labour supply, the solutions for public and private consumptions
are
Qt (Kt,Lt) =
yCt +RKt−1 −Kt + wmt (1− Lmt) + wft (1− Lft) + (αmtLmt + αftLft)
2p
Ct (Kt,Lt) = y
C
t +RKt−1 −Kt + wmt (1− Lmt) + wft (1− Lft)− pQt (Kt,Lt)
= pQt (Kt,Lt)− (αmtLmt + αftLft)
19
where consumptions are written as functions of (Kt,Lt) to highlight the fact that they are
conditional solutions.
Efficient risk sharing conditional on savings and employment We now consider the
intra-household allocation of resources during period t from an ex-ante perspective - that is,
before the realization of the shocks. Here, efficiency relates to sharing the wage and preference
risks. In this context, it requires the maximization of a weighted sum of expected utilities, using
the initial, logarithmic cardinalization, which reflects preferences towards risk. If µ denotes the
wife’s Pareto weight corresponding to that cardinalization, the standard efficiency condition
imposes that the ratio of marginal utilities of private consumption be constant (and equal to
the Pareto weight) for all periods and all realizations of the random shocks:7
∂umt (Qt, Cmt, Lmt)
∂Cmt
= µ
∂uft (Qt, Cft, Lft)
∂Cft
Note that the Pareto weight µ is a price endogenously determined in the marriage market.
Thus, it only depends on the information available then, namely the human capital of both
spouses (Hm, Hf ). Moreover, it remains constant over the couple’s working life - a direct










7See for example Townsend (1994).
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Therefore, the conditional (on employment and savings) instantaneous indirect utilities are








Note that Qt is also a function of the entire state space, including the wage and preference
shocks, savings and human capital, (et,αt, KT−1,H). We therefore write vit (Kt,Lt; et,αt, Kt−1,H, µ).
Expected value functions Appendix A shows that, for period T :
ET |T−1VmT (eT ,αT , KT−1,H, µ) = IT (eT−1,αT−1, KT−1,H) + ln
1
1 + µ
ET |T−1VfT (eT ,αT , KT−1,H, µ) = IT (eT−1,αT−1, KT−1,H) + ln
µ
1 + µ
where IT (eT−1,αT−1, KT−1,H) = ET |T−1 max
LT ,KT
[2 lnQT (LT , KT ) + ln p | eT−1,αT−1]
where expectations are taken over the (education-specific) distribution of (et,αt) conditional
on their realization at t− 1. Note that here KT = 0 since bequests are not being considered.
Given the conditional instantaneous indirect utilities in (17)-(18), it is easy to show by recursion
that the additive separability of the Pareto weight carries over to earlier periods:














where δ is the discount factor. The common term in the individual value functions, It, is
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defined recursively by
It (et−1,αt−1, Kt−1,H) = Et|t−1 max
Lt,KT
[2 lnQt (Lt, Kt) + ln p+ δI (et,αt, Kt,H) | et−1,αt−1]
where expectations are taken over the (education-specific) distribution of (et,αt) conditional
on (et−1,αt−1). A crucial feature of the above expressions is that the Pareto weight µ affects
individual welfare but drops out of the aggregate value function I, reflecting the TU property.
This then implies that the intertemporal optimality condition for savings (Euler equation)
is the same for both spouses. For any choice of labor supplies (including the optimal one),
















{2 lnQit (K∗t (Lt),Lt) + ln p+ δIt+1 (et,αt, K∗t (Lt),H)} .
The single’s problem is a close replica of the couple’s problem, just simpler, and its solution
can be derived using the same approach as briefly discussed in Appendix B.
3.1.2 The first period after marriage
The Markov processes for (et,αt) start at date t = 1, and initial savings are set to zero. So
the functions I1 and IS1 do not depend on past values of the shock or on past investment, but
only on human capital; we denote them respectively by Υ (H) and ΥS (Hi). It follows that the
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expected economic utility, at marriage, of each spouse is given by:
























which depends on the spouses’ respective levels of human capital and on the Pareto weight
µ that results from the matching game in the earlier lifecycle stage 2. For singles, expected
lifetime utility is simply:
V ς (Hi) = Υ
ς (Hi)
3.2 Matching
We now move to the second stage, i.e. the matching game. Remember that marriage decisions
are made before preferences and productivity shocks (α, e) are realized, and that we assume
full commitment. We first compute the expected utility of each spouse, conditional on the
Pareto weight µ. We then show that the model can be reinterpreted as a matching model
under TU; finally, we compute the equilibrium match and the corresponding Pareto weights.
3.2.1 Formal derivation
Consider a match between man with human capital Hm and woman with human capital
Hf . The spouses’ expected, economic lifetime utilities are given by (19)-(20). However, an
alternative cardinalization, already introduced in (4), turns out to be more convenient here.









then if H = (Hm, Hf ):
Ūm exp
{






















which expresses that the sum of individual, economic utilities add up to the marital gain Γ (H).
Lastly, we can add the idiosyncratic shocks to both sides of this equation; we finally have that,
for any married couple H = (Hm, Hf ):
Ūm + β
Hf
m + Ūf + β
Hm




f = gmf (22)
The matching game, therefore, has a transferable utility structure: if the utility of person i is




, then the Pareto frontier is a straight
line with slope -1.
In particular, whether matching will be assortative on human capital or not, depends on the
supermodularity of function Γ, given iid shocks (βm, βf ). One can easily check that the sign
of the second derivative ∂2Γ/∂Hm∂Hf is indeterminate (and can be either positive or negative
depending on the parameters); so this needs to be investigated empirically.8
8A result due to Graham (2011) states that, for the iid stochastic structure, for any two levels H and H̄ of
human capital, the total number of ‘assortative couples’ (i.e., Hand H or H̄and H̄) will exceed what would be
expected under purely random matching if and only if the deterministic function Γ is supermodular for H and
H̄ - i.e.:












That is what is meant by assortative matching.
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Clearly, one can equivalently use any of the two cardinalizations described before to study
marital sorting, because under TU matching patterns are driven by ordinal preferences; re-
member, though, that the Pareto weight µ refers to the initial cardinalization (Vm, Vf ). This
Pareto weight µ is match-specific; as such, it might in principle depend on the spouses’ stocks
of human capital, but also on their marital preferences. However, the following result, which
is a direct corollary of Theorem 1, states that this cannot be the case:
Corollary 2. At the stable match, consider two couples (m, f) and (m′, f ′) such that Hm = Hm′
and Hf = Hf ′. Then the Pareto weight is the same in both couples
Proof. From (11) in Theorem 1, we have that:
Um = Ūm + β
Hf
m = ŪM (Hm, Hf ) + β
Hf
m and
Uf = Ūf + β
Hm












we conclude that µ only depends on (Hm, Hf ).
3.3 The first stage in the lifecycle: Education Choice
The solution to the matching problem allows us to construct the expected value of marriage
for males and females, conditional on each of the three education levels. At this point the
stochastic structure is provided by the realization of random marital preferences and the costs
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of education, which can include exogenous shifters. Given this, the education choice is described
in equation (15)-(16).
As mentioned earlier, the first stage can be modeled as a normal form game, where each player’s
payoff depends on the other players’ decisions. As such, existence has to be demonstrated; and
neither uniqueness nor efficiency are guaranteed. We now discuss these issues.
The central idea, due to Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (2001) and Nöldeke and Samuelson
(2015), is to consider what we shall call an auxilliary game, defined as follows. Assume that
stages 1 (investment) and 2 (matching), instead of taking place sequentially, are simultaneous.
That is, consider the two stage game in which:
• At stage 1, agents match (based on their idiosyncratic charateristics, namely ability, edu-
cation costs and marital preferences), and choose their education. In particular, matched
pairs jointly (and efficiently) choose their respective investments in human capital.
• Stage 2 (the ‘working life’ stage) is identical to stage 3 of the initial game; i.e., it is
divided into T periods, during which individuals, whether single or married, observe
their (potential) wage and non labor income, and decide on consumptions and labor
supplies.
Again, the auxiliary game can be solved by backwards induction. The behavior of a given
couple is described as before; in particular, and using the same cardinalizations as in Subsection
3.2, the function Γ defined by (22) still characterizes the total surplus generated by a given
match. Then stage 1 is a typical matching model under transferable utility. A key remark
is that both utility when single and surplus when married are continuous functions of all
characteristics. The main result is:
Proposition Any stable match of the auxiliary game is a Nash equilibrium of the initial game.
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Proof. This is a direct consequence of Propositions 1 and 2 in Nöldeke and Samuelson (2015);
an equilibrium in the initial game corresponds to Nöldeke and Samuelson’s notion of an ex
post equilibrium, whereas a stable match of the auxiliary game is an ex ante equilibrium. The
only condition is continuity of the payoff functions, which is guaranteed in our case.
This result, in turn, has several implications. The most obvious one regards existence. The
Proposition implies that whenever there exists a stable match of the auxiliary game, then
there exists a Nash equilibrium of the initial game. Moreover, the auxiliary game is a standard
matching game under TU; stability, in this context, is equivalent to surplus maximization. In
the end, the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the initial game boils down to the existence of
a solution to an optimal transportation problem (i.e., finding a measure that maximizes total
surplus subject to conditions on the marginals). It is well known9 that such existence obtains
under mild continuity and compactness conditions that are satisfied in our case.
Uniqueness is a more difficult issue. Note, first, that the stable match of the auxiliary game
is ‘generically’ unique, in the sense that a maximization problem has ‘in general’ a unique
solution: while it is always possible to construct situations in which the maximum is reached
for different solutions, such cases are in general not robust to small perturbations.10 This,
however, does not imply uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the initial game. Indeed,
Cole, Mailath and Postlewaite (2001) and Nöldeke and Samuelson (2015) provide examples
of ‘coordination failures’, whereby an alternative, Nash equilibrium of the game involves all
agents investing in a globally suboptimal, but individually rational way.11 One intuition is that,
because of supermodularity, an agent’s optimal investment is typically an increasing function
9See for instance Chiappori, McCann and Nesheim (2010) and Chiappori, McCann and Pass (2015)
10A precise definition of the ‘genericity’ concept invoked in this - admitedly vague - statement would require
transversality arguments in functional spaces, which would be well beyond the scope of this paper.
11Nöldeke and Samuelson (2015) provide a set of conditions that are sufficient for uniqueness of ex post
equilibria. These conditions, however, are quite restrictive and cannot be expected to hold in our context.
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of the other agents’ education. In a context where the other agents underinvest, a person’s
best response is typically to underinvest as well, and these best responses may sometimes form
a Nash equilibrium.
While the study of coordination failures is an interesting topic, we will not pursue it in the
present context. From an empirical perspective, there is little evidence of global underinvest-
ment in education. Theoretically, in the presence of (potential) multiple equilibria, a natural
solution is to use an equilibrium refinement concept. In our case, a natural criterion is Pareto
efficiency, because, unlike most games, one of the equilibria is always Pareto efficient. In what
follows, we shall therefore concentrate on the (‘generically’ unique) stable matching of the
auxilliary game as the relevant Nash equilibrium.
4 Identification of the distribution of marital preferences.
The model as presented now requires a distributional assumption on marital preferences for
identification of the Pareto weights. However, this can be relaxed if we are willing to allow
preferences for marriage to depend on exogenous variables that do not affect the surplus from
marriage.
To do this we still assume that marriage generates a surplus, which is the sum of an ‘eco-
nomic’ component, reflecting the gains arising when marriage from both risk sharing and the
presence of a public good, and a non monetary term reflecting individual, idiosyncratic pref-
erences for marriage. The economic part is, as before, a deterministic function of the spouses’
respective levels of human capital; its distribution between husband and wife is endogenous
and determined by the equilibrium conditions on the marriage market. Regarding the non
monetary part, however, we assume that the non monetary benefit of agent i (= m, f) is the
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sum of a systematic effect, which depends on some of i’s observable characteristics (but not on
his spouse’s), and of an idiosyncratic term; as before, we assume that the idiosyncratic term,
modeled as a random shock, only depends on the human capital of i’s spouse. Equation (9) is
thus replaced with:















where Xi is a vector of observable characteristics of agent i. For instance, Xi may include the
education levels of i’s parents, a possible interpretation being that an individual’s preferences
for the spouses human capital is directly affected by the individual’s family background. Many
alternative interpretations are possible; the crucial assumption, here, is simply that the surplus
depends on both Xm and Xf but not on their interaction. Also, note that the coefficients a
and b may depend on both spouse’s human capital.
In such a setting, one can, under standard, full support assumptions, identify the vectors of
parameters aHm,Hf , bHm,Hf and the distribution of βHfm −β0m and βHmf −β0f (up to the standard
normalizations). To see why, note that Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 can be extended in the
following way:
Theorem 2. If the surplus is given by (23), then there exist 2 (NJ)2 numbers - ŪM (Hm, Hf )
and ŪF (Hm, Hf ) for (Hm, Hf ) ∈ H2 - such that:
1. For any (Hm, Hf )
ŪM (Hm, Hf ) + ŪF (Hm, Hf ) = Γ (Hm, Hf )
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2. For any m with human capital Hm married to f with human capital Hf ,




Uf = ŪF (Hm, Hf ) +Xfb
Hm,Hf + βHmf
with the normalization aHm,0 = b0,Hf = 0.
Proof. Assume that m and m′ have the same human capital Hm, and their respective partners
f and f ′ have the same human capital Hf . Stability requires that:




Hm,Hf + βHmf (24)
Um + Uf ′ ≥ Γ (Hm, Hf ) +XmaHm,Hf + β
Hf
m +Xf ′b
Hm,Hf + βHmf ′ (25)




HmHf + βHmf ′ (26)
Um′ + Uf ≥ Γ (Hm, Hf ) +Xm′aHmHf + β
Hf
m′ +Xfb
HmHf + βHmf (27)
Subtracting (24) from (25) and (27) from (26) gives
Uf ′ − Uf ≥ (Xf ′ −Xf ) bHm,Hf + βHmf ′ − β
Hm
f ≥ Uf ′ − Uf (28)
hence
Uf ′ − Uf = (Xf ′ −Xf ) bHm,Hf + βHmf ′ − β
Hm
f
It follows that the difference Uf −XfbHm,Hf − βHmf does not depend on f , i.e.:
Uf −XfbHm,Hf − βHmf = ŪF (Hm, Hf )
The proof for m is identical.
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As before, an immediate consequence is the following:
Corollary 3. 1. For any man m with human capital Hm, m’s spouse at the stable matching
has human capital Hf if and only if the following inequalities hold for all H ∈ H ∪ {0}:
ŪM (Hm, Hf ) +Xma
Hm,Hf + β
Hf
m ≥ ŪM (Hm, H) +XmaHm,H + βHm
2. For any woman f with human capital Hf , f ’s spouse at the stable matching has human
capital Hm if and only if the following inequalities hold for all H ∈ H ∪ {0}:
ŪF (Hm, Hf ) +Xfb
Hm,Hf + βHmf ≥ ŪF (H,Hf ) +Xfb
H,Hf + βHf












and the ex-ante expected utility of a female agent f with human capital Hf is:









where the expectation is over the distribution of unobserved preferences for spouse’s types,
βm and βf for men and women respectively.
It follows that the marital choice of any male m (female f) with human capital Hm (Hf ) boils
down to a standard, multinomial choice discrete model; the standard identification results
apply. However, in the version of this paper we rely on an extreme value distribution for
individual utilities and not on covariates.
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Beyond this, there are other important aspects of identification because both education and
marriage are endogenous in our model. A key identifying assumption is that marriage does
not cause changes in wages. In other words any correlation of wages and marital status is
attributed to composition effects. However, education does cause changes in wages and it is
likely that the ability composition of the various education groups differ: labor market ability
is known when educational choices are made in our model. To control for the endogeneity of
education we allow the costs of education to depend on residual parental income, when the
child was 16, after removing the effects of parental background (see below). The key idea is
that children need to be at least in part financed by their parents and if the latter suffer an
adverse liquidity shock this may inhibit educational attainment.
5 Data
Estimation uses the 18 annual waves (1991 to 2008) of the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS), which includes interviews with all household members over 16 and follows them even
when they start their own household.
We select two sub-samples drawn from the original members of the panel and those added
later. The main sample comprises longitudinal information for individuals born between 1951
and 1971 between the ages of 25 and 50.12 To this sample we add information on the spouses
they marry during the observation window. To avoid under-estimating marriage rates, those
who are not observed past age 30 are dropped from the sample. Overall, the final dataset
contains information on education, employment, earnings and family demographics for 4,295
families, 3,046 of which are couples and 629 and 620 are single women and men, respectively.
Of these, over 60% are observed for at least 5 years. We exclude Northern Ireland as it is only
12For couples, we take the reference year of birth to be that of the wife.
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surveyed in the booster samples, during the 2000s. In total, the sample size is just over of
41,000 observations.
In the resulting sample, singles are defined as individuals who are never observed married or
cohabiting. For the rest, who are classified as married, we only use observations during their
first observed marriage.
In estimating educational participation we use parental income observed when the child is 16.13
This information is only available for individuals who are observed living with their parents at
that age. So for this part of the model we use an additional smaller sample of individuals, born
between 1973 and 1985, containing parental income information when the young respondent
is aged between 16 and 18 and completed education by the age of 23. This sample includes
1,245 individuals, 636 of whom are women.
In the empirical analysis, employment is defined as working at least 5 hours per week. Earnings
are measured on a weekly basis. We use the central 5%-98% of the distribution of pre-tax real
earnings for employees only. Since our model does not deal with macroeconomic growth and
fluctuations, we subtract aggregate earnings growth from earnings. Finally, we consider 3
education levels, corresponding to secondary education (leaving school at 16), high school and
university (college) degree.
13We also need family background, since we actually use the residual parental income as we explain in the
estimation section.
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6 Empirical specification and estimation
6.1 Outline of estimation
We estimate the model in three steps. In a first step we estimate the age profiles of weekly
earnings (interchangeably referred to as wages) by gender and education. This is done outside
the model, based on the control function approach to allow for endogenous selection into work
and for the endogeneity of education. For the former we use policy variation in out-of-work
income as an instrument. For the latter we use the residual from a regression of parental
income when the person was 16 on their family background characteristics.
The next two steps take these wage profiles as given and are performed within the model. Since
we assume that preferences for work are drawn after the matching stage, we can separately
estimate the lifecycle model post marriage, exploiting the TU structure (which implies that
lifecycle labor supply, the public good and household consumption do not depend on the
Pareto weights). Given estimates for preferences and the distribution of unobserved ability,
we can then estimate the economic value of marriage for each type of match (by ability and
education - which define human capital) and for singles. In a final stage, taking these values
as given, we can estimate the preferences that drive marriage, the parameters driving the costs
of education and the implied Pareto weights. We now provide details on this procedure as well
as our specification.
6.2 Earnings process
The earnings wit of Individual (i) vary by gender (g), education (s), ability (θ) and age (t).
We thus estimate the following earnings equation:
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lnwit = lnW (θi, s, g) + δ
gs








i + eit + εit (31)
eit = ρ
gseit−1 + ξit (32)
where e is the productivity shock, assumed to follow an AR(1) process with normal innovations
ξit whose variance is σ2ξ,gs. εit is an independently and identically distributed shock with
variance σ2ε,gs that we interpret as measurement error. W (θi, s, g) is the market wage faced
by an individual of ability type (θi), gender g and schooling s. Ability is assumed to follow a
distribution with two points of support. While this can be viewed as an approximation from
the econometric point of view, it also simplifies the marital matching problem by defining a
finite number of individual types.14
In a first step we estimate the education and gender specific age profiles using a control function
approach as in Heckman (1979) to allow for endogenous selection into employment and for
the endogeneity of education. For this purpose we use a reduced form binary choice model
for employment driven by an index z′1βE. The education reduced form is taken to be an
unordered discrete choice among three levels (Secondary, High School and University). This
choice is driven by two separate indices z′2βHS and z′2βU as in a random utility model with three
alternatives. z1 are the instruments for employment and z2 are the instruments for education
choice. We then use the regression














2βU) + vit (33)
where ln w̃it are detrended wages and λE(z′1βE) is a control function for employment and






2βU) is a control function to account for the endogeneity of education.15
We use a probit for employment to estimate the index z′1βE and we then approximate λE(z′1βE)
by a quadratic function in the Mills ratio evaluated at the estimated index. As an instrument
we use the predicted residual out-of-work income. This is a residual from a regression of
predicted out of work income (based on the welfare system at the relevant time) on household
demographic composition and marital status (which are used in the calculation of welfare
benefits). Since we have many years of data we are identifying the impact of out of work
income on the basis of how it changes for different demographic groups over time. The probit
also includes time and age dummies.16
For education we use a multinomial logit model for the three levels of education we consider





2βU) by a quadratic function in the probability of attending high school and the
probability of attending college. As instruments for education we use residual parental income
and its squared.17 This is a residual of a regression of parental income when the person was 16,
on a set of family background variables. What is left is assumed to reflect a liquidity shock at
the time the individuals are making education choices.18 If individuals are to an extent liquidity
constrained when making education decisions this residual will affect educational outcomes.19
15We make the simplifying assumption that we can control for selection into employment by this simple
control function without accounting for the dependence of the employment and the education reduced form.
This is possible to relax if we estimate the model all in one step, but this is highly time consuming.
16Out of work income varies over time because of policy changes and over types of individual. It thus
provides important exogenous variation for identifying selection into work. However, our structural model does
not account for the tax and welfare system, something that we are intending to do in future. In estimating the
age education profiles outside the model we are thus able to use policy induced information that we could not
use if we estimated the entire model in one step.
17Ideally we would need two instruments, or assume that education choices are ordered. Our estimates are
almost identical if we assume that choices are ordered.
18see Blundell et al. (2016).
19Family background includes the education of both parents (five levels each), number of siblings and sibling
order (dummies for no siblings, three or more siblings, and whether respondent is the first child), books in
childhood home (three levels) and whether lived with both parents when aged 16.
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We assume that the liquidity shock does not affect either wages or preferences in later life, but
only the costs of education.
Having estimated the education and gender specific age profiles we then take these as known
and proceed to estimate the remaining components that determine post-marital behavior,
namely the stochastic process of wages characterized by σ2ξ,gs and ρgs and the variance of the
measurement error σ2ε , as well as the preferences of leisure and the distributions of unobserved
ability and unobserved preferences. This is described in the next section.
6.3 Estimating preferences and the distribution of wages
As already noted, and repeated here for convenience, the period utility function for the house-










An important feature, which we exploit in estimating the model, is that household utility and
therefore public good consumption and labor supply do not depend on the Pareto weights. To
capture the way labor supply varies over the lifecycle without having to control explicitly for
the presence of children and other important taste shifters over the lifecycle, we specify the α








2 + αgsγ3 t
3 + ηi + uit (34)
where the parameters (αgsγ` , ` = 0, ..., 3) are specific to gender (g), education (s) and marital
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status (γ = 1 for married and zero for single). In other words in our model, preferences for
singles and married individuals can differ. The variable η represents unobserved heterogene-
ity in preferences for working, accounting for persistent differences in labour supply across
individuals that are not fully explained by differences in earnings capacity. Individuals draw
preferences for work after the matching stage from a distribution that depends on education
and has two points of support (although this can easily be relaxed since individuals do not
match on this). This assumption allows us to take marital sorting as exogenous for labor
supply and to estimate the model for the post-marital choices separately. Finally, u is an
independently and identically distributed normal shock, drawn each period.
In general identification of preferences requires some variables to affect labor supply only
through wages. Various strategies are followed in the literature. For example, Blundell et al.
(2016) identify their labor supply model by using tax reforms that affect the return to work
but not preferences.20 In this simpler model we do not use this source of exogenous variation,
although in principle one could extend our model to allow for taxes and welfare benefits and
thus exploit policy changes. This is beyond the scope of the paper, but it is certainly part of
our future research program. Here the identification problem is resolved because of the very
tight specification of the utility function.
We set the annual discount factor δ to 0.98 and the annual interest rate to 0.015, implying that
agents have some degree of impatience.21 All other parameters are estimated using the method
of simulate moments.22 In our model there are 36 possible types of marital matches and indi-
viduals may also be single.23 For each possible match we simulate wages and labor supply for
the entire lifecycle and construct several simulated moments that we then match to the equiv-
20See also Blundell, Duncan and Meghir (1998).
21Same discount rate and interest rate was used in Blundell et al. (2016).
22McFadden (1989) and Pakes and Pollard (1989).
23Each person can have one of two ability levels and one of three education levels.
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alent data moments. This provides us with estimates for the joint distribution of unobserved
ability in all couple types (Pr (θm, θf | sm, sf ) for married couples and Pr (θi | si) , i = m, f
for singles), estimates of the α parameters, the distribution of preference heterogeneity (η),
and the stochastic process of wages (given the pre-estimated age profiles for each of the three
education groups). Critical to our strategy is the fact that we have estimates of the age edu-
cation profiles for men and women, from the previous step. By constructing wage series that
are censored whenever an individual decides not to work (based on the model) and matching
the resulting moments to those observed we control for selection into work when estimating
the stochastic process of wages.
From these estimates we can recover the marital sorting patterns by ability and education, as
well as the unconditional distribution of ability for men and women. Given this, the marriage
market outcomes - Pr(H | Hm) and Pr(H | Hf ) for all H ∈ H ∪ {0} and each Hm ∈ H and
Hf ∈ H - can be recovered by applying a simple conditional probability rule:
Pr (H | Hi) ≡ Pr (S, θ | Si, θi) =
Pr (S, Si, θ, θi)
Pr (Si, θi)
=
Pr (θ, θi | S, Si)Pr (S, Si)∑
s∈S∪{0} Pr (θi | s, Si)Pr (s, Si)
for i = m, f and where H = H(θ, S). All the quantities in the fourth expression are either
directly observed in the data (Pr (s, Si) for all s ∈ S ∪ {0}) or estimated from this estimation
stage (Pr (θ, θi | S, Si) and Pr (θi | s, Si)).
Heuristically, identification works as follows: the autocovariance structure of wage growth
identifies the stochastic process of wages. The cross sectional dispersion of wages and their
serial dependence that is not explainable by the stochastic process identifies the distribution
of unobserved heterogeneity in earnings. The age profiles of participation (for each education
and gender), given the already estimated age profiles of wages, identify the age effects on labor
supply. Finally, since unobserved heterogeneity induces persistence in employment choices,
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the degrees of individual labour market attachment over 5 years or more, as well as changes
with education, identifies the distribution of unobserved preference heterogeneity, given the
functional forms we choose.24
6.4 Preferences for marital sorting and education
In our model individuals choose education at a first stage in life and then enter the marriage
market. We allow for three levels of educational attainment: Secondary (statutory schooling),
High School (corresponding to A-levels or equivalent) and University, corresponding to 3-year
degrees or above. We interchangeably use the term college for this group. At the point
where they make the education and the matching decisions, ability of all individuals and their
preferences for partners are observable by all. Preferences for work are not known.
As discussed earlier this choice process can lead to many equilibria, one of which is efficient (see
Nöldeke, G., and L. Samuelson, 2015). This equilibrium is equivalent to one where individuals
choose education level and type of partner at the same time. We assume that the data is
characterized by that equilibrium and we thus estimate preferences for type of partner and the
determinants of education choice in one step. What follows is a discrete choice problem for
men and women, respectively, where each chooses one option out of all possible combinations
of education and types of spouse. Since we are assuming that the observed patterns correspond
to the efficient equilibrium we can then back out the Pareto weights, which are the prices that
decentralize this market.
24The 328 moments include the means, variances and several quantiles of the earnings distribution, the
regression coefficients of employment on a quadratic polynomial in age and moments describing the individual-
level persistency of employment, measured by the proportion of years working amongst those observed for at
least 5 years, all by education, gender and marital status. For couples, it also includes quantiles of the joint
distribution of earnings. A full list of data and simulated moments together with the diagnostics of the quality
of fit can be found in appendix D. Appendix C presents the estimated parameters.
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The value for a woman f with human capital Hf = HF (θf , sf ) marrying a man m with human
capital Hm = HM(θm, sm) is the sum of an economic component and a random preference
component for a type of spouse (defined by education and ability). In the earlier steps we have
estimated the parameters that allow us to compute the economic component for all possible
matches defined by the ability and education of each member of the couple, up to the Pareto
weight, which we will identify in this step. We can also compute the economic value of being
single for all types.
This utility can also be interpreted as the value of choosing both the level of education and
type of partner, given own ability, if we net out the costs of education. We define these costs










where the parameters ιgs are gender and education specific. We include the residual parental
income at 16, ypi , (described earlier) as a determinant of the costs of education.
The utility for female f with ability θf of choosing type of male partner H = HM(θ, s) and of
own education sf is given by
ŨF (θf , sf , H) =





where ŪF (H,HF ) corresponds to the economic value of marriage and βHf is a random preference
component for a type of spouse H. To this we have added extra components of marital
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preferences. Specifically, ϕF (HF (θf , sf )) is a set of six fixed coefficients (one for each type)
measuring the non-economic utility component for remaining single; and ϕ̃F (θf , |s− sf |) is
a set of coefficients capturing the (dis)taste for disparity in the educational attainment of
spouses. To preempt, these coefficients proved to be important for fitting the sorting patterns
in the data. Otherwise the simpler model predicted too little sorting.
The optimal schooling and partner choice is obtained by
(s∗f , H
∗) = argmaxsf ,H(ŨF (θf , sf , H) ∀ H, sf )
Assuming that βHf follows an extreme value I distribution the probability of any observed
choice given κ is given my the multinomial logit with 21 alternatives to choose from.25 To
obtain the probabilities that need to be matched with those observed in the data we integrate
out κ, which is assumed to be normally distributed, thus relaxing the distributional assumption
and in particular the independence of irrelevant alternatives.
Recall that ŪF is




VF (H,HF , µ(H,HF ))
)
where





1 + µ(H,HF )
where the µ are such that each individual has a well defined utility value.26 The key point is
that Υ(HM , HF ) can be computed on the basis of the estimates from the lifecycle estimation
25Three levels of own education, and a partner with one of two levels of ability and one of three levels of
education or remain single: 3×(3× 2 + 1).
26Recall that individual utility is in logs and hence the resulting argument after intrahousehold allocations
has to be positive.
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stage for each pair of (HM , HF ). We treat the Pareto weights as unknown parameters, along
with the various preference parameters, in the estimation problem.
The 36 Pareto weights, for each possible matched pair of (HM , HF ), can be fully identified just
by using the observed female choices (who they marry and what education level they choose).
However, in equilibrium, we can also use the male choices to identify the same Pareto weights,
which provides a set of overidentifying restrictions. This level of overidentification originates
from the fact that we can estimate the economic value of marriage from the lifecycle problem,
which generalizes the Choo and Siow (2006) approach. Using the male choices as well as the
female ones is also necessary for estimating the preferences for being single and for marrying
a different type of spouse than oneself for both genders.
We obtain the estimates by the method of moments estimator, using simultaneously the male
and the female choices where we match the observed choice probabilities to the equivalent
ones implied by the model. In doing so we also minimize the distance between the predicted
marital patterns based on the male choices and those based on the female ones, thus finding
the parameters that are most consistent with equilibrium. The extent to which the resulting
predicted patterns differ from each other is a diagnostic for whether the model can rationalise
the observed pattern as an equilibrium in the marriage market.
7 Results
All estimates relating to the earnings equations, the results on the distribution of ability as
well as the preference parameters determining labor supply choices are presented in Appendix
C, since they are not of a central interest in themselves. We also present details on the overall
model fit.
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7.1 The Parameters for marital sorting and education choice.
Table 1 presents the preference parameters governing marital sorting. Preferences for remaining
single increase with education. Higher ability men have a lower preference for being single,
while the contrary is true for higher ability women. The parameters on the panel below reflect
the utility cost of educational disparity within a couple as perceived by each partner: the more
disparate the educational levels, the higher is the utility cost, but this differs substantially by
gender and ability. One exception to the preference for similarity are lower ability men who
prefer a spouse that is one education level above or below them.
Table 1: Utility shifters - preferences for remaining single and for marrying similarly educated
spouses
Men by ability Women by ability
low high low high
Preference for remaining single, by education (ϕF (HF (θf , sf )))
Secondary 1.502 -1.373 -0.164 1.590
(0.207) (0.583) (0.093) (0.565)
High School 2.207 -0.912 1.142 3.630
(0.575) (0.457) (0.164) (0.862)
University 3.385 -0.420 3.896 5.552
(0.827) (0.106) (1.545) (1.753)
Preference for differently educated spouses (ϕ̃F (θf , |s− sf |))
One educational level diff 0.344 -0.698 -0.104 -0.114
(0.034) (0.243) (0.244) (0.116)
Two educational levels diff -2.732 -1.377 -4.287 -0.873
(0.660) (0.358) (1.548) (0.114)
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses computed using the bootstrap.
Table 2 shows the costs of education implied by the estimates. A reduction in parental income
at age 16 reduces both high school participation and college attendance (increases the cost
of education). Although the coefficients for the effect on college are lower, this is no surprise
44
Table 2: Utility cost of education
men women
HS Univ HS Univ
constant 1.073 3.912 1.864 6.294
(0.337) (1.321) (0.503) (2.341)
Parental income at 16 (residual) -0.335 -0.160 -0.523 -0.075
(0.155) (0.095) (0.135) (0.037)
Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses computed using the bootstrap.
since college attendance takes place 2-3 years later and hence the effect of the shock may have
been attenuated by that time.27
7.2 The marital surplus
We start by ranking individuals by their human capital as measured by their lifecycle earnings
earnings capacity, which are a function of ability and education. For women earnings capacity
increases with education and ability. However, being a university graduate implies higher
earnings, whatever the level of ability. For men high ability high school graduates have a
higher earnings capacity than lower ability university graduates. Table 3 reports the ranking of
human capital by education and ability and the value of being single. The value of being single
increases monotonically with individual human capital for both men and women. However,
the increase is much steeper for women, which is part of the reason why single women tend to
be drawn from the higher part of the human capital distribution.
Table 4 presents the economic surplus for all possible 36 combinations of human capital for
couples. This is the economic value of marriage, over and above the value of remaining single.
27Remember that the parental income is a residual, where the effects of family background have been removed.
Moreover, we observe family income at the time the child was 16 only for a (younger) subsample of the data.
In a richer model it would be desirable to also control for family background, which would affect wages and
preferences potentially. However this would increase the state space and the resulting possible matches beyond
the capabilities of our data.
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Table 3: Human Capital and the value of being single
Females
HC Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6
Education (ability) Secondary (L) High School (L) Secondary (H) High School (H) University (L) University (H)
Value of Single 33.4 61.8 88.6 88.6 191.5 293.0
Males
HC Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6
Education (ability) Secondary (L) High School (L) Secondary (H) University (L) High School (H) University (H)
Value of Single 114.9 150.1 220.4 276.7 300.2 441.1
HC: Human Capital; H: High ability. L: Low ability; higher rank corresponds to higher human capital.
There are two important conclusions from this. First, the gradient of the surplus is much
steeper with respect to female human capital than it is with respect to male. This is because the
impact of education on female earnings (conditional on employment) and on employment itself
is much higher for women than it is for men. We show this in Figures 1 and 2.28 Hence a large
part of the variation in the surplus is explained by the human capital of the woman. Second,
the surplus is generally super modular, particularly for higher levels of human capital. This will
push towards positive assortative matching if it were not for preferences for marriage as implied
by the random preferences βHi . This can be seen by noticing that for for most 2×2 submatrices,
the sum of diagonal terms exceeds the sum of off-diagonal ones. In particular, all 2x2 matrices
at the top of the human capital distribution (i.e. those including the top three levels for
each gender) are supermodular. Similarly, all 2x2 submatrices involving human capital levels
not immediately adjacent are positive, suggesting that violations of supermodularity, although
possible, are mostly ’local’.
7.3 Marital patterns
The share of the surplus and the marital patterns drive the choice of partner. The Pareto
weights implied by the choices of males are not restricted to be the same as those implied
28These being earnings they include hours dimensions as well, which are not modeled here. In interpreting
male and female differences it is important to note that many women work part time, at varying degrees over
the lifecycle, while men nearly always work full time.
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Table 4: Economic surplus from marriage
women’s ability and education
Men’s educ
and ability Sec (L) HS (L) Sec (H) HS (H) Univ (L) Univ (H)
Sec (L) 85.06 148.88 189.26 189.10 197.17 245.39
HS (L) 82.61 144.33 189.53 185.97 199.87 249.21
Sec (H) 129.54 210.34 266.84 264.88 299.85 370.86
Univ (L) 101.45 176.79 241.15 232.27 268.43 338.90
HS (H) 139.01 220.91 288.21 281.00 326.74 405.43
Univ (H) 142.96 234.71 317.10 305.31 366.01 460.91
Rows and Columns ordered by male and female human capital respectively. L and H signify low and
high ability respectively.


































by the observed choices of the females. In equilibrium they should be, but since the model
is heavily overidentified this will in general not be the case in a finite sample even if the
restrictions we impose are true in the population. In a final step of estimation we choose the
Pareto weights that minimize the difference in implied marital patterns when comparing male
and female choices. The matches are shown in Table 5 and are remarkably similar. For 50% of
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Table 5: Marital Matching patterns
Women’s education
Men’s educ Sec HS Univ Sec HS Univ
Simulated Proportions Data Proportions
Men’s choices
Sec 0.322 0.068 0.001 0.291 0.094 0.014
HS 0.159 0.124 0.026 0.156 0.126 0.032
Univ 0.007 0.047 0.048 0.019 0.044 0.053
Simulated Proportions Data Proportions
Women’s choices
Sec 0.328 0.071 0.001 0.291 0.094 0.014
HS 0.158 0.125 0.029 0.156 0.126 0.032
Univ 0.007 0.050 0.050 0.019 0.044 0.053
The numbers represent cell proportions.
married couples both partners have the same level of education; however there are substantial
amount of marriages that do not follow this rule. Hence along the educational dimension the
sorting patterns are not perfectly assortative and the model is able to fit this.
Table 6 shows the composition of the singles sorted by their level of human capital.29 Seventy
three percent of single men are low ability,30 compared to 30% in the population. By contrast
among single women only twenty seven percent are low ability,31 compared to 40% in the
population. Once ranked by the value of human capital, as measured by potential earnings
over the lifecycle, we still see that the majority of single women are high human capital and
the majority of single men are at the lower end. Finally, the complete set of marital patterns
conditional on being married, as implied by our model, are presented in Table 7. The matches
that actually form will depend on the Pareto weights, and we turn to these now.
29Here and in what follows we rank individuals by the level of their potential lifecycle earnings, which depends
on education and ability. The lowest level is denoted by 1 and increases up to 6.
30Human capital level is 1, 2 and 4.
31Human capital level is 1, 2 and 5.
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Table 6: Proportion of singles by level of human capital.
Level of Human Capital 1 2 3 4 5 6
Women 0.11 0.08 0.14 0.39 0.07 0.21
Men 0.22 0.31 0.07 0.20 0.16 0.04
Levels of human capital in increasing order: A. Men 1: Secondary - low ability, 2: High
School Low ability, 3: Secondary High ability, 4: University Low ability, 5: High School
- High ability, 6: University High ability; B. Women 1: Secondary - low ability, 2: High
School- Low ability, 3: Secondary High ability, 4: High School - High ability, 5: University
L- Low ability, 6: University High ability.
7.4 Sorting and the sharing rule
The estimated Pareto weights reveal the allocation of welfare within the household in the
context of the equilibrium observed in the data. This takes into account the public good
and the labor supply/leisure decision. Non-market time and private consumption are perfect
substitutes, while both are complements of public consumption. Table 8 shows the men’s share
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Table 7: Sorting patterns conditional on marriage by eduction and ability
women’s ability and education
Sec (L) HS (L) Sec (H) HS (H) Univ (L) Univ (H)
Sec (L) 0.041 0.025 0.044 0.015 0.000 0.000
HS (L) 0.031 0.011 0.034 0.006 0.004 0.004
Sec (H) 0.145 0.030 0.171 0.016 0.000 0.001
Univ (L) 0.000 0.010 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.004
HS (H) 0.053 0.084 0.078 0.053 0.012 0.014
Univ (H) 0.000 0.025 0.009 0.017 0.025 0.028
Rows and Columns ordered by male and female human capital respectively. L and H signify low
and high ability respectively. Cell proportions reported.
in the gains from marriage that clear the market.32
Table 8: Sharing rule
women’s ability and education
Men’s educ
and ability Sec (L) HS (L) Sec (H) HS (H) Univ (L) Univ (H)
Sec (L) 0.835 0.363 0.512 0.161 0.248 0.162
(0.261) (0.114) (0.148) (0.080) (0.073) (0.040)
HS(L) 0.938 0.606 0.596 0.376 0.038 0.019
(0.335) (0.254) (0.212) (0.152) (0.024) (0.021)
Sec (H) 0.613 0.449 0.448 0.294 0.070 0.089
(0.225) (0.172) (0.155) (0.127) (0.047) (0.052)
Univ (L) 0.937 0.857 0.936 0.661 0.429 0.353
(0.330) (0.343) (0.335) (0.231) (0.165) (0.110)
HS (H) 0.767 0.495 0.582 0.362 0.228 0.196
(0.252) (0.193) (0.188) (0.142) (0.037) (0.065)
Univ (H) 0.699 0.756 0.747 0.614 0.415 0.360
(0.330) (0.285) (0.262) (0.213) (0.136) (0.121)
Notes: Male Share of Surplus. Asymptotic standard errors in parentheses computed using
the bootstrap. Ordering of cells by male and female human capital respectively. L and H
signify low and high ability respectively
In principle, the relationship between a person’s human capital and share of welfare need not
be strictly monotonic; the share also reflects relative scarcity of spouses at each level of human
capital, and therefore depends on the entire distribution. Still, we see that in most (but not all)
32Note that, given super-modularity of the economic component (when this is the case), a marriage between
spouses of very different skills signals large values of the corresponding marital preference.
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cases the male share declines in his wife’s human capital. Among couples of college graduates
with higher ability, the share favors women. Low skill men marrying the lowest skill women
(1st column) benefit from very high shares. However, if a low skill man marries a highest skill
woman (a very rare combination - 0.01% of the population) she gets 84% of welfare, reflecting
a very high Pareto weight for her. Among couples where the husband is much more skilled
than the wife, most of her utility comes from time off work (she is indeed less likely to work),
public consumption, and her marital preference.
The sorting we observe and the resulting Pareto weights are driven by the structure of the
surplus. We have already seen how this varies as a function of human capital. The way
it changes across groups is driven both by human capital at the time of matching and by
its stochastic properties, since marriage allows risk sharing. In Figure 3 we show how the
aggregate surplus33 varies when we change the variance of earnings of men and women by the
same factor. The figure shows that as uncertainty rises the economic value of marriage relative
to being single increases because of risk sharing. Halving the variance reduces the aggregate
surplus from marriage by 10%, and doubling it increases it by 15%.
Lastly, it is crucial to keep in mind that the Pareto weights, and more generally the patterns
of intra-household distribution of resources and welfare, are not structural parameters but
endogenous entities reflecting the conditions in the marriage market. The present estimations
reflect the patterns we see in the data. In what follows we carry out a counterfactual simulation,
that will yield new Pareto weights and marital patterns.
One of the key points of our approach is that part of the returns to education can be accounted
for by marriage and in particular by the sharing of the marital gains. Thus, ignoring the
preferences for marital status, marital returns to high school account for 73% of the entire
33Weighted average across all matches, with weights the probability of a match with baseline risk and
conditional on marriage.
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proportional change in variance of shocks in earnings
return to HS for women, assuming optimal choice of partner. Marital returns account for 58%
of the female college premium. Both these numbers demonstrate the importance of marriage
in determining the returns to education for women. For men there is a similar impact, but it
is smaller: the respective effects are 14% for high school and 21% for college.
8 Counterfactual Simulations
The model offers us a way of interpreting the data as well as the possibility of counterfactual
analysis with an emphasis on longer run outcomes. Here we examine the impact of reducing
the costs of university education by 5%. The key mechanism that can cause the realignments
in the marriage market and indeed change the welfare of men and women is the increased
supply of college graduates of both genders, which will affect the types of individuals that
enter the marriage market. The changes in the implied Pareto weights will then feed back into
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the education choice.
The final equilibrium distribution of education shows an increase in the supply of both male
and female college graduates, but more so for women (see Table 9). These supply changes are
associated with both changes in the matching patterns and the welfare share for each type of
match. The former are shown in Tables 10 and 11 while the latter in Table 12. Generally there
is an increase in the proportion of college educated women marrying non-college educated men,
as well as an increase in matches among college educated men and women. As shown in Table
11 the proportion of singles increases.
Table 9: Education distribution
Men women
baseline low cost Univ baseline low cost Univ
Distribution of education
Sec 0.452 0.429 0.542 0.517
HS 0.398 0.385 0.329 0.318
Univ 0.150 0.186 0.128 0.166
Table 10: Changes in the matching patterns
Women’s education and ability
Men’s educ
and ability Sec (L) HS (L) Sec (H) HS (H) Univ (L) Univ (H)
Sec (L) -0.07 -0.12 -0.18 -0.04 -0.02 -0.01
HS (L) -0.22 -0.07 -0.13 -0.02 0.34 0.02
Sec (H) -0.41 -0.10 -0.50 -0.06 -0.01 0.00
Univ (L) 0.00 0.08 -0.02 0.06 0.01 0.09
HS (H) -0.11 -0.22 -0.27 -0.18 0.05 0.12
Univ (H) 0.00 0.20 0.06 0.12 0.49 0.55
NUmbers correspond to changes in the proportion of each cell. Ordering of cells by male and
female human capital respectively. L and H signify low and high ability respectively
However Table 12 reveals very interesting changes in the way welfare is distributed within the
household. A negative value means a decrease in the male share in favor of the female one.
These results imply that subsidizing women to increase college attendance can increase their
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Table 11: Marital patterns
Men women
baseline low cost Univ baseline low cost Univ
proportion remaining single 0.193 0.196 0.190 0.197
proportion marrying equally educated spouse 0.502 0.497 0.500 0.494
share of welfare, particularly for the lower skill ones, as well as for those who marry high skill
men. For example the welfare share of low ability male college graduates marrying low ability
high school graduates declines by 2.6 percentage points. Female college graduates however do
not necessarily gain themselves: the share of college graduates declines. These patterns are
driven by the change in the relative scarcity of partners at each skill level.
Underlying these results is the convergence to a new long run equilibrium, with changes in
educational attainment relative to the immediate effect induced by the subsidy, as the marital
patterns change and the Pareto weights adjust. In future research it will be important to
examine how changes in welfare benefits and their targeting affects marital patterns and life
cycle work and consumption decisions.
Table 12: Changes in the sharing rule - percentage points
Women’s educ and ability
Men’s educ
and ability Sec (L) HS (L) Sec (H) HS (H) Univ (L) Univ (H)
Sec (L) -0.2 0.7 0.4 0.5 -0.2 -2.2
HS (L) -1.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 5.5 2.8
Sec (H) -0.1 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.2 0.9
Univ (L) -0.5 -2.6 0.5 -2.4 1.0 0.7
HS (H) -0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.1 2.2 1.6
Univ (H) 0.0 -2.2 -1.5 -1.9 0.1 0.2
Ordering of cells by male and female human capital respectively. L and H signify low and
high ability respectively. A negative number corresponds to a decline in the male share.
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9 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have presented an equilibrium model of education choice, marriage and life-
cycle labor supply, savings and public goods in a world with uncertainty in the labor market.
Our framework relies on a transferable utility setting, which allows us to simulate policies
that change the economic environment at any stage of the lifecycle. Matching in the marriage
market is stochastic but frictionless and trades off the economic value of marriage with random
preferences for type of mate (defined by their human capital). On the economic side, the final
structure of matching is driven both from the demand for public goods and from a risk sharing
motive.
We find that the surplus from marriage is super-modular nearly everywhere, pushing towards
positive assortative matching, with any departures from perfect sorting being driven by random
preferences for mates and by some local departure from supermodularity. We also find that
the human capital of women is a very strong determinant of marital surplus, more so than the
human capital of men. The model is able to replicate matching patterns very well, despite the
fact we do not allow for frictions.
Generally high human capital women get more than half of the marital surplus, while men
marrying low human capital women get most of the surplus. These shares reflect the existing
equilibrium in the data. However, the share of welfare is endogenous and changes in the
supply of men and women of different levels of human capital can change them. Thus in our
counterfactual simulation, where we reduce the costs of education, inducing more to graduate
from college we find that the share of low human capital women increases, while the share of
low ability college graduate women declines.
Lastly, our model sheds light on the determinants of human capital investments. Two conclu-
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sions emerge. First, non-economic factors play an important role in both the decision to marry
and the marital patterns conditional on marriage and therefore indirectly affect the return to
education. This is by no means surprising. However, our approach allows us to quantify the
magnitude of these effects; we find them to be quite large. Second, and more importantly, we
can explicitly decompose the returns to education into those perceived on the labor market
and those reaped in addition on the marriage market (the “marital college premium”). Our
results are unambiguous: the benefits perceived through marriage (through risk sharing and
the joint consumption of public goods) are dominant. Our analysis, therefore, confirms the no-
tion, put forth by CIW, that any empirical analysis that omits marital gains and concentrates
exclusively on the labor market may be severely biased. An important implication is that a
policy (e.g., a tax reform) that directly affects the returns on human capital investment will
also alter the respective importance of economic and non-economic factors for the determi-
nation of matching patterns, further influencing incentives to invest; these equilibrium effects
will typically amplify the initial impact, resulting in potentially large long-term consequences
that should not be ignored.
This paper is a first step towards a rich research agenda analyzing the interactions of marriage,
labor markets and educational choices. Generalizations will include allowing for imperfectly
transferable utility,34 generalizing the model to allow for divorce and finally allowing for limited
commitment. These are important issues that will lead to better understanding of marriage
markets and intra-household inequality. However they are also challenging. Our framework
here shows, however that such equilibrium models can be rich in implications and valuable for
the understanding of the longer term effects of policies.
Finally, the framework developed in this model, complicated as it may be, relies on two simple
but extremely powerful insights. One is that marital sorting patterns – who marries whom –
34see Galichon et al. (2016) for a recent contribution along these lines.
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have an important, economic component, which can be analyzed in terms of ‘complementarity’
or ‘substitutability’ (in technical terms, super- or sub-modularity) of the surplus created within
marriage; the second, that the intra household allocation of resources (therefore of welfare) is
related to the equilibrium conditions prevailing on the ‘marriage market’, and should therefore
be analyzed using the ‘theory of optimal assignments’ (aka matching models). Both insights
are explicitly present in Becker’s 1973 JPE masterpiece. That, more than forty years later, we
can still find much to learn in exploiting these insights is an obvious tribute to the importance
of Becker’s contribution.
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10 Online Appendix
Appendix A: The solution of the household problem in the last period
of life
Consumptions Take a man m ∈ M with human capital Hm married to a woman f ∈ F
with with human capital Hf . All the results below are conditional on the time-invariant human
capital of the spouses, H = (Hm, Hf ), and we omit them for simplicity. Each period/age t
sees the arrival of new information on each spouse’s preferences for working and productivity,
αt = (αmt, αft) and et = (emt, eft).
The problem of this couple at time T is
max
QT ,CT ,LT
QT (CT + αmTLmT + αfTLfT )
s.t. budget constraint: yCT + wmT + wfT +RKT−1 = CT + wmTLmT + wfTLfT + pQT
wage equation (2)
Here, KT−1 denotes savings accumulated at the end of period T − 1 and transferred to period
t at the risk-free interest factor R; and YT = is the couple’s total (‘potential’) income in period
t. yCT + wmT + wfT is the sum of the maximum possible labor income, wmt + wft (where total
possible working time has been normalized to 1 for each individual), and the couple’s non labor
income, yCT . Note that the latter may depend on individual labor supplies and earnings.
Since T is the last period of life and bequests are not being considered in this problem, the
optimal savings is KT = 0 and the problem is static. We can thus derive total household
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consumptions as functions of labor supplies:
QT =




yCT + wmT (1− LmT ) + wfT (1− LfT ) +RKT−1 − (αmTLmT + αfTLfT )
2






T + wmT (1− LmT ) + wfT (1− LfT ) +RKT−1 + (αmTLmT + αfTLfT )
)2
Labour supplies The pair (LmT , LfT ) can take four values - namely (0, 0) , (1, 0) , (0, 1) and






yCT (LmT , LfT ) + wmT (1− LmT ) + wfT (1− LfT ) +RKT−1 + (αmTLmT + αfTLfT )
)2
Therefore labor supply patterns depend on the realization of the preference shoks αmT and
αfT . Specifically:
• conditional on the woman’s labor supply, LfT , the man does not work (LmT = 1) if
wmT + y
C
T (0, LfT ) ≥ αmT + yCT (1, LfT ), and will work otherwise
• similarly, conditional on LmT , the woman does not work (LfT = 1) if wfT +yCT (LmT , 0) ≥
αfT + y
C
T (LmT , 1), and will work otherwise
Note that (generically on the realization of the shocks) all Pareto-efficient allocations cor-
respond to the same labor supply pattern; this is a direct consequence of the (ordinal) TU
property. The various efficient allocations differ only by the allocation of private consumption.
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Efficient risk sharing We now consider the allocation of private consumption during the
last subperiod from an ex-ante perspective - that is, before the realization of the shocks.
Efficiency, here, is relative to sharing the (wages and preferences) risks. Efficiency, in this
context, requires the maximization of a weighted sum of expected utilities, obviously using the
initial, logarithmic cardinalizations. If µ denotes the wife’s Pareto weight corresponding to
that cardinalization, the standard efficiency condition becomes:
∂um (QT , CmT , LmT )
∂C
= µ











and finally indirect utilities:
vmT = 2 lnQT + ln p+ ln
1
1 + µ
vfT = 2 lnQT + ln p+ ln
µ
1 + µ
Note that QT depends on the realization of the wage and preferences shocks, eT and αT , as
well as savings, non labor income and the spouses’ respective stocks of human capital (through
their impact on wages); we therefore write QT (eT ,αT , KT−1,H) and viT (eT ,αT , KT−1,H, µ),
where H = (Hm, Hf ).
Expected value functions We assume that the unobserved productivity shocks and pref-
erences for time off paid work, (e,α), follow a first-order Markov process. Then, the expected
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value functions are
VmT (eT−1,αT−1, KT−1,H, µ) = ET |T−1 [vmT (eT ,αT , KT−1,H, µ) | eT−1,αT−1]












IT (eT−1,αT−1, KT−1, H) = ET |T−1 [2 lnQT (eT ,αT , KT−1, H) + ln p | eT−1,αT−1]
= 2
∫
lnQT (eT ,αT , KT−1, H) dF (eT ,αT | eT−1,αT−1) + ln p
Appendix B: Employment, consumption and savings for singles
At time t, a single individual i chooses (Lit, Qit, Cit, Kit) to maximize lifetime utility:
(CitQit + αitLit) + δI
ς
i,t+1 (eit, αit, Kit, Hi)
subject to the budget constraint
wit (1− Lit) + yςit +RKi,t−1 = Kit + Cit + pQit
where wit (1− Lit) is the individual’s labor income and ySt is non labor income, itself possibly
a function of employment and labor income.
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Conditionally on labour supply and savings, the consumptions are
Qit (Kit, Lit) =
yςit +RKi,t−1 −Kit + wit (1− Lit) + αitLit
2p
Cit (Kit, Lit) = pQit (Kit, Lit)− αitLit
and the choice of (Kit, Lit) solves the maximization problem
V ςit (eit, αit, Ki,t−1, Hi) = max
Lit,Kit
{
2 lnQit (Kit, Lit) + ln p+ δI
ς
i,t+1 (eit, αit, Kit, Hi)
}
where







2 lnQit (Kit, Lit) + δI
ς














Lςit = arg max
Lt∈{0,1}
{2 lnQit (Kit(Lt), Lt) + ln p+ δIi,t+1 (eit, αit, Kςit, Hi)} .
Appendix C: Estimates of model parameters
Table 13 contains estimates of the parameters in the stochastic wage process. The education
premium (row 2) and the education-specific age profiles (rows 4-6) were estimated in the first
stage reduced form model of education choice, employment and wages. Estimates of the first
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stage regressions can be found in tables 14 and 15. The other parameters were estimated
within the structural model taking employment choice into account. In here, ability types 1
and 2 stand for low and high productivity, respectively. What is interesting to notice is that
the returns to education are more important for women than men, a finding illustrated in
figure 2 by the narrowing of the gender wage gap with education. The high market premium
of education for women can be partly driven by the short working hours that women with
statutory education do (see Blundell et al., 2015). Moreover, education narrows the ability
wage gap among women, with a premium that is much more modest for university graduates
than other groups.
Table 13: Earnings process by gender and education
Men Women
Sec HS Univ Sec HS Univ
(1) log earnings (ab 1, stat ed, age 23) 3.01 2.45
(.01) (.03)
(2) education premium 0.065 0.096 0.246 0.497
(0.029) (0.036) (0.055) (0.075)
(3) ability premium (type 2) 0.148 0.143 0.095 0.457 0.287 0.280
(.03) (.02) (.04) (.03) (.06) (.06)
(4) age (δ1) 0.339 0.622 1.002 -0.242 0.177 0.664
(0.063) (0.062) (0.092) (0.114) (0.111) (0.180)
(5) age squared (δ2) -0.160 -0.318 -0.527 0.128 -0.205 -0.597
(0.052) (0.050) (0.077) (0.091) (0.092) (0.146)
(6) age cubic (δ3) 0.023 0.053 0.091 -0.007 0.063 0.156
(0.013) (0.012) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022) (0.035)
(7) Autocorr coeff (ρ) 0.836 0.825 0.889 0.845 0.909 0.855
(0.051) (0.070) (0.039) (0.049) (0.027) (0.047)
(8) Var innov in prod (σ2ξ ) 0.27 0.023 0.021 0.046 0.072 0.074
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.012) (0.013)
(9) Var ME (σ2ε ) 0.016 0.011 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.004
(0.011) (0.009) (0.019) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020)
N 9,116 11,990 4,291 8,432 7,469 3,962
Notes: SE in brackets under estimates. Earnings are in logs of £1,000 per year, 2008 prices.
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Table 14: Education regressions - multinomial logit
men women
High School
parental income residual 0.477* 0.576**
(0.244) (0.266)
parental income residual squared -0.068* -0.181
(0.037) (0.325)





parental income: residual 1.389*** 0.843***
(0.342) (0.311)
parental income: residual squared -0.459** -0.199
(0.216) (0.351)





Notes: Three alternatives are modeled: Secondary School, High School and Univer-
sity. Standard Errors in brackets under estimates. Parental income is net of the
effects of long-term characteristics of the parental household including parental ed-
ucation, whether both parents at home, number of siblings, sibling order, ethnicity
and region of residence.
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Table 15: Employment regressions - probit
men women
parental income: residual 0.332*** 0.578***
(0.113) (0.129)
parental income: residual squared -0.122* 0.080
(0.069) (0.196)





Notes: SE in brackets under estimates. Parental income is net of the ef-
fects of long-term characteristics of the parental household including parental
education, whether both parents at home, number of siblings, sibling order,
ethnicity and region of residence. Unearned income is net of the effects of
family composition. Regressions also include year and age dummies.
Tables 16 and 17 show the probability weights in the distribution of ability in couples and for
singles, respectively. Estimates for couples are conditional on the education of both spouses
and each square displays the mass in all points in the conditional distribution, thus adding up
to 1. The table discloses some interesting regularities, with ability type 2 (the more productive
type) being relatively more frequent amongst more educated couples. Among singles, ability
type 1 (low productivity) is more prevalent for those with basic education only, and single men
are comparatively more likely to be of this ability type then single women.
Finally, estimates of the preference parameters are presented in table 18.
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Table 16: Probability weights for the joint distribution of ability in couples by spouses’ edu-
cation
Men
Secondary High School University





ability 1 0.128 0.543 0.174 0.488 0.208 0.434
(0.031) (0.055) (0.042) (0.065) (0.114) (0.230)
ability 2 0.071 0.258 0.248 0.090 0.094 0.263
(0.039) (0.039) (0.118)
High School
ability 1 0.099 0.489 0.137 0.334 0.174 0.225
(0.060) (0.090) (0.055) (0.100) (0.093) (0.104)
ability 2 0.079 0.333 0.118 0.412 0.077 0.525
(0.082) (0.063) (0.116)
University
ability 1 0.092 0.345 0.081 0.099 0.070 0.099
(0.199) (0.236) (0.064) (0.128) (0.052) (0.102)
ability 2 0.077 0.486 0.070 0.749 0.131 0.700
(0.161) (0.083) (0.071)
Table 17: Proportion of ability type 1 among singles by gender and education
Secondary High School University
men 0.737 0.654 0.863
(0.062) (0.087) (0.195)
women 0.417 0.125 0.155
(0.155) (0.092) (0.281)
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Table 18: Preference parameters and distribution of unobserved heterogeneity in preferences
for employment
Men Women
Stat HS Univ Stat HS Univ
Couples
intercept (α0) 0.259 0.244 0.607 0.700 0.702 1.366
(0.331) (0.990) (1.099) (0.313) (0.481) (0.413)
age (α1) -0.137 -0.023 -0.010 -0.092 -0.128 0.040
(0.250) (0.348) (0.586) (0.497) (0.505) (0.365)
age squared (α2) -0.172 -0.163 0.079 -0.561 0.143 0.065
(0.252) (0.252) (0.380) (0.407) (0.276) (0.224)
age cubic (α3) 0.104 0.083 -0.005 0.229 -0.057 -0.023
(0.100) (0.069) (0.188) (0.099) (0.114) (0.110)
Singles
intercept (α0) -0.300 1.011 1.295 0.606 1.070 2.267
(0.444) (0.886) (1.260) (0.398) (0.434) (0.537)
age (α1) 1.460 0.200 -0.099 0.524 -0.096 -0.521
(0.436) (0.754) (1.043) (0.434) (0.378) (0.452)
age squared (α2) -0.424 0.129 -0.079 -0.204 -0.157 -0.569
(0.478) (0.776) (0.703) (0.402) (0.696) (0.369)
age cubic (α3) 0.032 -0.075 0.068 0.064 0.078 0.275
(0.254) (0.208) (0.205) (0.200) (0.350) (0.064)
Unobserved preferences
low utility from work (η = 2) 2.478 1.770 1.072 1.160 0.928 0.517
(0.272) (0.948) (1.286) (0.416) (0.356) (0.531)
probability utility type 2 0.617 0.634 0.453 0.542 0.483 0.557
(0.059) (0.112) (0.279) (0.194) (0.302) (0.268)
Var transitory pref shock (u) 0.564 1.007 1.074 0.370 0.676 0.942
(0.226) (0.490) (0.963) (0.233) (0.191) (0.496)
Notes: SE in brackets under estimates.
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Appendix D: Fit
This appendix describes the fit of the model. We start by comparing the employment and
earnings profiles in the data with those obtained from model simulations in Figures 4 and 5.
The model is capable of capturing well these profiles.


































Notes: Full lines are for BHPS data and the dashed lines are for model simulations.
The rest of this appendix contains tables showing all data moments used in estimation and
their simulated counterparts, together with the ratio of the difference between the two moments
and the standard error of the data estimate.
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Table 19: Distr log earnings net of age effects: single men
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
secondary education
mean 2.731 2.710 0.041 0.53
var 0.153 0.155 0.022 0.10
P(earnings<Q10) 0.100 0.160 0.023 2.59
P(earnings<Q25) 0.250 0.306 0.037 1.52
P(earnings<Q50) 0.500 0.528 0.047 0.61
P(earnings<Q75) 0.750 0.759 0.042 0.22
P(earnings<Q90) 0.900 0.880 0.036 0.53
high school
mean 2.798 2.799 0.049 0.02
var 0.197 0.130 0.029 2.32
P(earnings<Q10) 0.100 0.068 0.026 1.16
P(earnings<Q25) 0.250 0.220 0.041 0.71
P(earnings<Q50) 0.500 0.526 0.052 0.50
P(earnings<Q75) 0.750 0.786 0.047 0.76
P(earnings<Q90) 0.900 0.943 0.033 1.30
university education
mean 2.766 2.800 0.067 0.52
var 0.185 0.113 0.034 2.09
P(earnings<Q10) 0.100 0.041 0.033 1.74
P(earnings<Q25) 0.250 0.188 0.063 0.97
P(earnings<Q50) 0.500 0.474 0.080 0.32
P(earnings<Q75) 0.750 0.785 0.065 0.54
P(earnings<Q90) 0.900 0.924 0.035 0.68
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Table 20: Distr log earnings net of age effects: single women
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
secondary education
mean 2.756 2.706 0.052 0.95
var 0.291 0.217 0.031 2.35
P(earnings<Q10) 0.100 0.087 0.021 0.60
P(earnings<Q25) 0.250 0.256 0.038 0.17
P(earnings<Q50) 0.500 0.612 0.051 2.20
P(earnings<Q75) 0.750 0.824 0.041 1.79
P(earnings<Q90) 0.900 0.927 0.027 1.01
high school
mean 2.966 2.788 0.064 2.75
var 0.227 0.340 0.045 2.46
P(earnings<Q10) 0.100 0.188 0.035 2.46
P(earnings<Q25) 0.250 0.522 0.058 4.65
P(earnings<Q50) 0.500 0.693 0.059 3.27
P(earnings<Q75) 0.750 0.791 0.049 0.85
P(earnings<Q90) 0.900 0.863 0.026 1.34
university education
mean 3.101 2.968 0.052 2.53
var 0.150 0.231 0.024 3.25
P(earnings<Q10) 0.100 0.269 0.027 6.24
P(earnings<Q25) 0.250 0.420 0.053 3.18
P(earnings<Q50) 0.500 0.637 0.074 1.83
P(earnings<Q75) 0.750 0.819 0.065 1.06
P(earnings<Q90) 0.900 0.875 0.048 0.49
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Table 21: Distr log earnings net of age effects: men in couples
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
secondary education
mean 2.916 2.944 0.016 1.73
var 0.142 0.134 0.007 1.02
P(earnings<Q10) 0.100 0.098 0.010 0.10
P(earnings<Q25) 0.250 0.231 0.018 1.02
P(earnings<Q50) 0.500 0.470 0.020 1.49
P(earnings<Q75) 0.750 0.721 0.016 1.70
P(earnings<Q90) 0.900 0.881 0.010 1.66
High School
mean 2.973 2.941 0.016 2.04
var 0.122 0.125 0.007 0.35
P(earnings<Q10) 0.100 0.135 0.012 2.94
P(earnings<Q25) 0.250 0.294 0.018 2.44
P(earnings<Q50) 0.500 0.543 0.022 1.95
P(earnings<Q75) 0.750 0.771 0.019 1.11
P(earnings<Q90) 0.900 0.902 0.011 0.20
University
mean 3.020 2.976 0.023 1.84
var 0.114 0.122 0.013 0.63
P(earnings<Q10) 0.100 0.164 0.020 3.24
P(earnings<Q25) 0.250 0.365 0.030 3.83
P(earnings<Q50) 0.500 0.577 0.036 2.14
P(earnings<Q75) 0.750 0.773 0.031 0.75
P(earnings<Q90) 0.900 0.901 0.017 0.07
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Table 22: Distr log earnings net of age effects: women in couples
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
secondary education
mean 2.507 2.526 0.021 0.89
var 0.338 0.275 0.013 4.87
P(earnings<Q10) 0.100 0.051 0.009 5.35
P(earnings<Q25) 0.250 0.231 0.013 1.33
P(earnings<Q50) 0.500 0.491 0.017 0.48
P(earnings<Q75) 0.750 0.770 0.015 1.31
P(earnings<Q90) 0.900 0.911 0.011 1.06
High School
mean 2.728 2.711 0.027 0.63
var 0.355 0.329 0.020 1.21
P(earnings<Q10) 0.100 0.042 0.012 4.72
P(earnings<Q25) 0.250 0.288 0.019 1.98
P(earnings<Q50) 0.500 0.603 0.021 4.85
P(earnings<Q75) 0.750 0.787 0.018 2.08
P(earnings<Q90) 0.900 0.877 0.012 1.89
University
mean 3.000 2.949 0.033 1.52
var 0.243 0.265 0.021 1.04
P(earnings<Q10) 0.100 0.110 0.016 0.64
P(earnings<Q25) 0.250 0.374 0.027 4.52
P(earnings<Q50) 0.500 0.613 0.033 3.35
P(earnings<Q75) 0.750 0.776 0.028 0.92
P(earnings<Q90) 0.900 0.869 0.020 1.47
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Table 23: Distribuition log earnings net of age effects: men in couple by spouses’s education
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
secondary education
mean: spouse second educ 2.921 2.940 0.014 1.33
mean: spouse high school 2.978 2.948 0.023 1.29
mean: spouse univ educ 2.935 2.950 0.075 0.20
var: spouse second educ 0.149 0.137 0.007 1.64
var: spouse high school 0.121 0.128 0.008 0.77
var: spouse univ educ 0.146 0.130 0.022 0.74
High School
mean: spouse second educ 2.941 2.905 0.016 2.28
mean: spouse high school 3.001 2.964 0.019 1.93
mean: spouse univ educ 3.083 2.999 0.035 2.36
var: spouse second educ 0.119 0.130 0.009 1.21
var: spouse high school 0.133 0.118 0.008 1.80
var: spouse univ educ 0.119 0.110 0.018 0.46
University
mean: spouse second educ 2.988 2.975 0.049 0.27
mean: spouse high school 2.999 2.974 0.033 0.74
mean: spouse univ educ 2.978 2.981 0.029 0.13
var: spouse second educ 0.149 0.122 0.038 0.72
var: spouse high school 0.125 0.123 0.027 0.04
var: spouse univ educ 0.181 0.124 0.027 2.10
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Table 24: Distribuition log earnings net of age effects: women in couple by spouses’s education
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
secondary education
mean: spouse second educ 2.458 2.451 0.021 0.31
mean: spouse high school 2.534 2.526 0.026 0.33
mean: spouse univ educ 2.443 2.479 0.088 0.41
var: spouse second educ 0.308 0.300 0.011 0.69
var: spouse high school 0.295 0.290 0.017 0.31
var: spouse univ educ 0.416 0.303 0.053 2.11
High School
mean: spouse second educ 2.670 2.675 0.039 0.12
mean: spouse high school 2.732 2.716 0.030 0.53
mean: spouse univ educ 2.784 2.696 0.049 1.78
var: spouse second educ 0.378 0.322 0.023 2.35
var: spouse high school 0.352 0.334 0.020 0.89
var: spouse univ educ 0.368 0.328 0.034 1.16
University
mean: spouse second educ 2.958 2.877 0.101 0.79
mean: spouse high school 2.953 2.944 0.056 0.16
mean: spouse univ educ 2.986 2.952 0.037 0.90
var: spouse second educ 0.327 0.268 0.083 0.70
var: spouse high school 0.319 0.257 0.032 1.92
var: spouse univ educ 0.281 0.255 0.028 0.93
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Table 25: Joint distribution of log earnings net of age effects for men with secondary education,
by women’s education
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Women’s education: secondary
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.090 0.161 0.009 7.25
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.096 0.147 0.010 4.71
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.068 0.083 0.008 1.79
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.142 0.152 0.010 0.99
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.180 0.158 0.011 1.82
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.116 0.095 0.011 1.89
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.105 0.074 0.010 2.93
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.121 0.081 0.011 3.69
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.078 0.044 0.010 3.40
Women’s education: high school
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.089 0.110 0.011 1.75
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.141 0.144 0.016 0.19
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.093 0.094 0.014 0.02
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.114 0.127 0.012 1.10
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.178 0.156 0.014 1.50
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.127 0.094 0.012 2.54
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.080 0.090 0.012 0.78
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.095 0.114 0.011 1.57
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.079 0.067 0.014 0.86
Women’s education: university
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.080 0.141 0.040 1.51
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.114 0.137 0.044 0.53
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.080 0.071 0.031 0.31
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.128 0.121 0.040 0.19
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.133 0.147 0.045 0.30
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.123 0.085 0.039 0.99
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.138 0.107 0.042 0.72
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.123 0.119 0.040 0.11
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.076 0.069 0.033 0.19
Notes: (Q1, Q2, Q3) denote the 3 thirds of the distribution of earnings. They are measured
separately by education for men and women.
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Table 26: Joint distribution of log earnings net of age effects for men who completed high
school, by women’s education
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Women’s education: secondary
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.087 0.149 0.017 3.63
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.096 0.151 0.017 3.16
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.068 0.083 0.015 0.95
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.123 0.150 0.017 1.53
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.165 0.164 0.021 0.02
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.091 0.095 0.015 0.24
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.108 0.076 0.018 1.75
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.172 0.080 0.024 3.81
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.085 0.047 0.016 2.27
Women’s education: high school
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.073 0.099 0.011 2.19
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.125 0.105 0.015 1.27
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.065 0.063 0.011 0.18
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.110 0.142 0.014 2.28
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.167 0.167 0.019 0.04
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.124 0.104 0.016 1.19
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.125 0.110 0.016 0.88
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.112 0.128 0.014 1.09
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.095 0.078 0.015 1.10
Women’s education: university
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.088 0.137 0.032 1.52
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.089 0.145 0.021 2.54
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.083 0.085 0.020 0.08
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.081 0.118 0.024 1.48
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.224 0.145 0.036 2.15
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.147 0.080 0.025 2.63
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.099 0.102 0.021 0.14
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.104 0.118 0.021 0.66
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.080 0.066 0.017 0.82
Notes: (Q1, Q2, Q3) denote the 3 thirds of the distribution of earnings. They are measured
separately by education for men and women.
79
Table 27: Joint distribution of log earnings net of age effects for men with university education,
by women’s education
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Women’s education: secondary
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.069 0.199 0.041 3.13
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.167 0.134 0.081 0.41
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.027 0.061 0.019 1.68
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.125 0.190 0.055 1.17
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.216 0.148 0.052 1.31
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.020 0.059 0.017 2.24
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.146 0.098 0.061 0.78
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.139 0.071 0.051 1.32
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.083 0.036 0.037 1.27
Women’s education: high school
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.071 0.103 0.021 1.45
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.045 0.077 0.013 2.46
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.030 0.034 0.015 0.27
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.121 0.190 0.028 2.41
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.140 0.164 0.031 0.77
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.118 0.075 0.027 1.53
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.129 0.154 0.031 0.80
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.161 0.134 0.029 0.91
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.181 0.066 0.042 2.74
Women’s education: university
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.080 0.162 0.015 5.33
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.126 0.137 0.022 0.48
lnWm ∈ Q1, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.077 0.061 0.019 0.85
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.120 0.152 0.023 1.38
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.168 0.129 0.020 1.90
lnWm ∈ Q2, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.117 0.064 0.022 2.42
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q1 0.073 0.127 0.019 2.81
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q2 0.133 0.108 0.020 1.16
lnWm ∈ Q3, lnWf ∈ Q3 0.102 0.055 0.023 1.97
Notes: (Q1, Q2, Q3) denote the 3 thirds of the distribution of earnings. They are measured
separately by education for men and women.
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Table 28: Distribution of log earnings among men - autocorrelation of earnings net of age
effects
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Secondary education
variance 0.150 0.142 0.006 1.33
1st autocorrelation 0.111 0.113 0.004 0.46
2nd autocorrelation 0.100 0.100 0.007 0.07
3rd autocorrelation 0.092 0.088 0.007 0.41
High School
variance 0.134 0.127 0.005 1.35
1st autocorrelation 0.105 0.102 0.003 0.83
2nd autocorrelation 0.098 0.091 0.006 1.04
3rd autocorrelation 0.094 0.082 0.006 1.82
University
variance 0.163 0.127 0.014 2.43
1st autocorrelation 0.124 0.108 0.009 1.57
2nd autocorrelation 0.106 0.099 0.016 0.46
3rd autocorrelation 0.098 0.090 0.015 0.51
Table 29: Distribution of log earnings among women - autocorrelation of earnings net of age
effects
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Secondary education
variance 0.308 0.294 0.008 1.58
1st autocorrelation 0.260 0.240 0.007 2.76
2nd autocorrelation 0.239 0.221 0.013 1.31
3rd autocorrelation 0.224 0.206 0.015 1.20
High School
variance 0.351 0.331 0.012 1.61
1st autocorrelation 0.296 0.273 0.011 2.00
2nd autocorrelation 0.280 0.244 0.019 1.80
3rd autocorrelation 0.266 0.220 0.020 2.24
University
variance 0.294 0.256 0.019 1.94
1st autocorrelation 0.237 0.201 0.014 2.61
2nd autocorrelation 0.221 0.171 0.023 2.12
3rd autocorrelation 0.210 0.145 0.024 2.66
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Table 30: Regression coefficients - employment on age, men
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Secondary education, married
intercept 0.801 0.824 0.046 0.48
age 0.187 0.086 0.102 0.98
age square -0.111 -0.003 0.071 1.51
age cube 0.016 -0.016 0.015 2.16
Secondary education, singles
intercept 0.841 0.818 0.122 0.19
age -0.121 -0.229 0.307 0.35
age square -0.030 0.102 0.224 0.59
age cube 0.017 -0.017 0.049 0.70
High School, married
intercept 0.913 0.928 0.032 0.44
age 0.054 0.050 0.072 0.05
age square -0.018 -0.018 0.051 0.01
age cube -0.000 -0.001 0.011 0.08
High School, singles
intercept 0.542 0.759 0.163 1.33
age 0.517 -0.018 0.353 1.51
age square -0.301 0.009 0.251 1.24
age cube 0.056 0.004 0.055 0.93
University, married
intercept 0.964 0.932 0.034 0.92
age 0.009 0.067 0.088 0.65
age square -0.000 -0.042 0.066 0.63
age cube -0.002 0.006 0.014 0.63
University, singles
intercept 0.747 0.781 0.237 0.14
age 0.168 0.138 0.547 0.05
age square -0.071 -0.031 0.370 0.11
age cube 0.007 -0.010 0.076 0.24
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Table 31: Regression coefficients - employment on age, men
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Secondary education, married
intercept 0.589 0.600 0.055 0.20
age 0.000 -0.042 0.123 0.34
age square 0.122 0.149 0.084 0.32
age cube -0.039 -0.051 0.018 0.65
Secondary education, singles
intercept 0.738 0.664 0.141 0.52
age -0.377 -0.246 0.303 0.43
age square 0.265 0.155 0.209 0.53
age cube -0.062 -0.040 0.044 0.48
High School, married
intercept 0.819 0.804 0.056 0.26
age -0.097 -0.012 0.128 0.66
age square 0.089 -0.014 0.092 1.13
age cube -0.019 0.013 0.020 1.64
High School, singles
intercept 0.701 0.652 0.189 0.26
age 0.186 0.252 0.386 0.17
age square -0.127 -0.175 0.257 0.19
age cube 0.030 0.040 0.053 0.19
University, married
intercept 0.917 0.834 0.071 1.16
age -0.054 0.104 0.187 0.85
age square -0.042 -0.139 0.143 0.67
age cube 0.023 0.043 0.032 0.63
University, singles
intercept 0.647 0.652 0.287 0.02
age 0.427 0.284 0.648 0.22
age square -0.199 -0.072 0.438 0.29
age cube 0.021 -0.009 0.089 0.34
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Table 32: Distribution of employment among men
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Secondary education, married
employment rate 0.869 0.868 0.007 0.09
% time employed < 0.2 0.069 0.018 0.008 6.09
% time employed < 0.4 0.103 0.055 0.009 4.94
% time employed < 0.6 0.133 0.146 0.011 1.07
% time employed < 0.8 0.188 0.292 0.013 7.66
Secondary education, singles
employment rate 0.670 0.674 0.031 0.13
% time employed < 0.2 0.275 0.246 0.038 0.73
% time employed < 0.4 0.355 0.341 0.043 0.31
% time employed < 0.6 0.434 0.380 0.044 1.22
% time employed < 0.8 0.500 0.417 0.044 1.84
High School, married
employment rate 0.944 0.949 0.005 0.96
% time employed < 0.2 0.023 0.000 0.005 4.47
% time employed < 0.4 0.032 0.001 0.006 4.91
% time employed < 0.6 0.042 0.020 0.007 3.13
% time employed < 0.8 0.073 0.107 0.008 3.93
High School, singles
employment rate 0.811 0.774 0.026 1.40
% time employed < 0.2 0.135 0.039 0.035 2.71
% time employed < 0.4 0.184 0.138 0.039 1.17
% time employed < 0.6 0.242 0.285 0.042 1.01
% time employed < 0.8 0.359 0.423 0.046 1.39
University, married
employment rate 0.962 0.957 0.005 0.93
% time employed < 0.2 0.006 0.000 0.004 1.37
% time employed < 0.4 0.016 0.000 0.007 2.13
% time employed < 0.6 0.026 0.007 0.009 2.02
% time employed < 0.8 0.053 0.065 0.012 0.92
University, singles
employment rate 0.851 0.853 0.030 0.07
% time employed < 0.2 0.078 0.003 0.039 1.91
% time employed < 0.4 0.078 0.026 0.039 1.33
% time employed < 0.6 0.137 0.098 0.049 0.78
% time employed < 0.8 0.294 0.368 0.065 1.13
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Table 33: Distribution of employment among women
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Secondary, married
employment rate 0.712 0.667 0.009 4.56
% time employed < 0.2 0.158 0.182 0.011 2.10
% time employed < 0.4 0.239 0.286 0.012 3.88
% time employed < 0.6 0.333 0.386 0.013 4.09
% time employed < 0.8 0.441 0.502 0.013 4.48
Secondary, singles
employment rate 0.550 0.511 0.026 1.46
% time employed < 0.2 0.338 0.342 0.031 0.12
% time employed < 0.4 0.419 0.455 0.032 1.12
% time employed < 0.6 0.494 0.565 0.033 2.11
% time employed < 0.8 0.590 0.681 0.030 2.97
High School, married
employment rate 0.807 0.808 0.010 0.05
% time employed < 0.2 0.085 0.039 0.010 4.40
% time employed < 0.4 0.142 0.093 0.013 3.75
% time employed < 0.6 0.218 0.196 0.016 1.42
% time employed < 0.8 0.321 0.379 0.018 3.06
High School, singles
employment rate 0.803 0.768 0.027 1.27
% time employed < 0.2 0.084 0.059 0.024 1.01
% time employed < 0.4 0.158 0.134 0.033 0.74
% time employed < 0.6 0.242 0.258 0.039 0.39
% time employed < 0.8 0.308 0.466 0.044 3.59
University, married
employment rate 0.838 0.841 0.015 0.14
% time employed < 0.2 0.062 0.004 0.014 4.12
% time employed < 0.4 0.102 0.033 0.017 3.97
% time employed < 0.6 0.158 0.105 0.022 2.35
% time employed < 0.8 0.261 0.351 0.028 3.21
University, singles
employment rate 0.868 0.834 0.034 1.00
% time employed < 0.2 0.071 0.011 0.041 1.46
% time employed < 0.4 0.095 0.051 0.048 0.91
% time employed < 0.6 0.119 0.164 0.049 0.92
% time employed < 0.8 0.166 0.384 0.054 3.98
85

































Notes: Full lines are for BHPS data and the dashed lines are for model simulations. Annual











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 35: Distribution of education by gender
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Men
Secondary 0.452 0.447 0.008 0.50
High school 0.396 0.401 0.008 0.64
University 0.151 0.150 0.005 0.19
Women
Secondary 0.511 0.540 0.008 3.61
High school 0.346 0.331 0.007 1.84
University 0.142 0.128 0.005 2.56
Table 36: Regression coefficients: education on residual parental income by gender
Moment Data Simulated SE data No. SE diff
Men, Secondary
parental income: residual -0.148 -0.121 0.047 0.55
parental income: residual squared 0.022 0.007 0.008 1.76
Men, High School
parental income: residual 0.005 0.113 0.051 2.13
parental income: residual squared -0.001 -0.006 0.008 0.65
Women, Secondary
parental income: residual -0.133 -0.143 0.049 0.21
parental income: residual squared 0.045 -0.003 0.055 0.88
Women, High School
parental income: residual 0.044 0.131 0.055 1.59
parental income: residual squared -0.032 0.029 0.062 0.99
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